Costs and Benefits of 'Friendly' Boards during Mergers and Acquisitions

By Breno Schmidt. 2015

268 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5b3d790eaeffc53a53a54c80ffcd8330c99a772e

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Citations in the corpus

Board gender diversity and dividend policy in Australian listed firms: the effect of ownership concentration (2019, unknown): “Setia-Atmaja (2010) demonstrate a negative price-to-book ratio-dividend payment relationship.”
Do Social Ties between External Auditors and Audit Committee Members Affect Audit Quality (2016, background): “Although Schmidt (2009) documents the benefits of a friendly board during mergers and acquisitions, he also finds that, when there is a greater need for board monitoring, firms with stronger CEO-board social connections make poor merger and acquisition decisions.”
Do school ties between auditors and client executives influence audit outcomes (2016, unknown): “, 2007), corporate investments (Schmidt, 2015), and financing decisions (Engelberg et al.”
Board of directors, audit committee, and firm performance: Evidence from Greece (2018, background): “lack firm-specific knowledge of operation activities, and (ii) in situations where board’s advisory role is more important than monitoring role, independence can decrease firm value (see, e.g., Adams and Ferreira 2007; Schmidt 2015).”
Do General Managerial Skills Spur Innovation? (2017, unknown): “Thus, we also control for CEO age and other observable characteristics such as CEO education, tenure, connections, and compensation structure (Barker andMueller 2002; Coles et al. 2006, 2017; Bereskin and Hsu 2012; Engelberg et al. 2013; Faleye et al. 2014; Schmidt 2015).”
Does Corporate Board Diversity Affect Corporate Payout Policy (2016, unknown): “This finding is in line with the growing literature which suggests that informal social ties between directors and the CEO impede objective monitoring of the CEO and board independence (Hwang and Kim (2009, 2011) and Schmidt (2009)).”
Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions (2019, unknown): “Consistent with this idea, Schmidt (2015) finds that bidders with boards that are socially connected to the CEO earn positive short- and long-run stock returns in firms where the potential value of board advice is high, but that returns are negative when monitoring needs are high.”