The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets
By Bernard S. Black. 2001
297 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/368e627026ce06a9c7fe31a7d51fb51d126423f2
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- V. Atanasov
- Bernard S. Black
- M. V. Dijk
- Peter Roosenboom
- S. Gyoshev
- Conrad S. Ciccotello
- N. R. Zagha
- Gobind T. Nankani
In Finance
- Bernard S. Black
- V. Atanasov
- M. V. Dijk
- Peter Roosenboom
- S. Gyoshev
- Conrad S. Ciccotello
- N. R. Zagha
- Gobind T. Nankani
In Strategy and Management
- M. V. Dijk
- N. R. Zagha
- Peter Roosenboom
- Gobind T. Nankani
- V. Atanasov
- Bernard S. Black
- Ronald W. Masulis
- E. Zhang
Citations in the corpus
- Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? (2000, unknown): “119 Black (2000), supra note 6, discusses the institutions that underlie strong securities markets.”
- Bringing institutions into performance persistence research: Exploring the impact of product, financial, and labor market institutions (2010, unknown): “(Black, 2001), investor protection, and corporate governance (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000).”
- The legislative road to Silicon Valley (2006, unknown): “It was therefore thought that policymakers wishing to foster venture capital markets could only do so indirectly, by implementing legal measures that are conducive to the development of liquid stock markets, such as disclosure laws, minority shareholder protection, and antidirector rights (La Porta ”
- Economic growth in the 1990s : learning from a decade of reform (2005, background): “Third and more fundamentally,weak institutional factors—poor information, poor treatment of minority shareholders, and weak regulation of market participants—weaken the interest of investors, both domestic and foreign, in many equity markets (Glaesner, Johnson, and Schleifer 2001; LaPorta, López de ”
- Law, politics, and finance (2001, unknown): “See, Black (2001) for a detailed analysis of the legal and institutional prerequisites for well-functioning securities markets.”
- National Governance System, Corporate Ownership, and Roles of Outside Directors: A Corporate Governance Bundle Perspective (2014, unknown): “The regulatory agency can also punish board members for their negligence. disclosure and regulate market intermediaries (Black, 2001; Coffee, 1999; Levine, 1998; Levine & Zervos, 1996; Pistor et al., 2000), thus alleviating information asymmetry and reducing information cost (Black & Kraakman,…”
- What Works in Securities Laws (2006, unknown): “See Landis (1938), Friend and Herman (1964), Coffee (1984 ,1989, 2002), Simon (1989), Mahoney (1995), Fox (1999), Stulz (1999), Black (2001), Beny (2002), and Reese and Weisbach (2002).”
- The market reaction to cross-listings: Does the destination market matter? (2009, background): “Coffee (1999), Stulz (1999), and Black (2001) argue that firms can “bond” themselves by crosslisting on a stock exchange with higher standards of investor protection in order to protect minority shareholders.”
- How Does Law Affect Finance? An Examination of Equity Tunneling in Bulgaria (2010, background): “…tunneling through dilutive offerings and below-market freezeouts affects minority 1 Other related studies, in addition to those cited above, include Black (2001a) and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), who assess which aspects of securities law predict stronger securities markets,…”