Financial Networks and Contagion

By Matthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub, Matthew O. Jackson. 2014

1,190 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3557986f42cb998d0803486b98dbca14f66328e3

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Citations in the corpus

Bank Networks: Contagion, Systemic Risk and Prudential Policy (2017, neutral): “Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Afonso and Shin (2011) or Elliott et al. (2014) analyze this channel using lattice-theoretic methods to solve for the unique fixed point of an equilibrium mapping.”
Networks, Shocks, and Systemic Risk (2015, background): “The second is the related paper by Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014), which also considers financial contagion in a network, though based on microfoundations linked to cross-shareholdings across institutions rather than the counterparty risk as in our own previous work.”
Efficiency and Stability of a Financial Architecture with Too-Interconnected-to-Fail Institutions (2017, neutral): “…also proved to be a useful analytical tool for studying financial contagion from a theoretical perspective (Allen and Gale, 2000; Leitner, 2005; Elliott, Golub, and Jackson, 2014; Cabrales, Gottardi, and Vega-Redondo, 2016; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2015; Glasserman and Young,…”
Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: A Survey (2020, neutral): “This is not just a theoretical concern, as there is evidence that two banks are much more likely to be counterparties if their portfolios are more correlated (Elliott et al. (2018)), suggesting that banks that are connected via financial obligations also tend to be more connected via commonalities i”
DStress: Efficient Differentially Private Computations on Distributed Data (2017, methodology): “In theory, it would be possible to quantify the risk of such a cascading failure by looking at the graph of financial dependencies between the banks, and in fact economists have already developed a number of metrics [25, 27] that could be used to quantify this “systemic” risk, and to ideally give so”
Networks and the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Exploration (2016, neutral): “2015c; Elliott, Golub, and Jackson 2014; Cabrales, Gottardi, and Vega- Redondo 2014), and the idea/innovation network, which can lead to the spread of new knowledge, innovations, and practices (studied, for example, in Acemoglu, Akcigit, and Kerr [2015], as well as indirectly in Bloom et al.”
Exploring the sources of default clustering (2018, neutral): “The key feature of contagion is that a default has an impact on the default rates of other firms, as in the network models of Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar & Tahbaz-Salehi (2012), Eisenberg & Noe (2001), Elliott et al. (2014) and many others.”
Too Interconnected to Fail: A Survey of the Interbank Networks Literature (2015, background): “Elliott et al. (2014) show how the probability and the magnitude of cascades depends on two characteristics of the cross-holdings.”
Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk (2017, neutral): “…indirectly) are more robust to shocks, because of risk-sharing, but are more likely to see all institutions fail conditionally on a large shock.9 Elliott, Golub, and Jackson (2014) study the role of two intuitive properties of an interbank network, namely integration (how much banks rely on…”
Transmission channels of systemic risk and contagion in the European financial network (2015, neutral): “Freixas et al. (2000) use interbank credit lines to explore liquidity shocks emerged from uncertainty about where consumers will withdraw funds.”