Bank Networks: Contagion, Systemic Risk and Prudential Policy

By Iñaki Aldasoro, Domenico Delli Gatti, Ester Faia. Social Science Research Network, 2017

126 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We present a network model of the interbank market in which optimizing risk averse banks lend to each other and invest in non-liquid assets. Market clearing takes place through a tâtonnement process which yields the equilibrium price, while traded quantities are determined by means of a matching algorithm. We compare three alternative matching algorithms: maximum entropy, closest matching and random matching. Contagion occurs through liquidity hoarding, interbank interlinkages and fire sale externalities. The resulting network configurations exhibits a core-periphery structure, dis-assortative behavior and low clustering coefficient. We measure systemic importance by means of network centrality and input-output metrics and the contribution of systemic risk by means of Shapley values. Within this framework we analyze the effects of prudential policies on the stability/efficiency trade-off. Liquidity requirements unequivocally decrease systemic risk but at the cost of lower efficiency (measured by aggregate investment in non-liquid assets); equity requirements tend to reduce risk (hence increase stability) without reducing significantly overall investment.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ea6b0d4d336c7636d5e9604586a8c198e88da576

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