Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market

By Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Murat F. Iyigun, Y. Weiss. Social Science Research Network, 2009

480 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns: the labor-market return, resulting from higher wages, and a marriage-market return, defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract. Men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles. This asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses. When the labor-market return to schooling rises, home production demands less time, and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken, more women may invest in schooling than men. (JEL I21, J12, J24, J31)

Subfields: Accounting, Demography, Gender Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/352f6dec1b2e18690179f048d1e1e0044ee6b21b

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Citations in the corpus

Families in Macroeconomics (2016, unknown): “Choukhmane et al. (2014) conduct a richer analysis using a life-cycle model and more detailed micro data.”
The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice (2015, unknown): “AM(Hm) = max Hf∈H∪{0} ( ŪM (Hm, Hf ) + β Hf m ) (13)”
The Career Costs of Children (2017, unknown): “16 Dynamic models of marriage markets and schooling or labor supply have been derived by, e.g., Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009) and Eckstein and Lifshitz (2015).”
Human Capital Investments and Expectations about Career and Family (2016, unknown): “Empirical work in this area (using ex post outcomes) finds evidence consistent with this, but the literature usually infers the returns in the marriage market indirectly.(17) In this section, we examine whether college students believe human capital would”
The Effect of Job Flexibility on Female Labor Market Outcomes: Estimates from a Search and Bargaining Model (2012, background): “33 The main explanations proposed so far have focused on the positive returns in the marriage market, see Chiappori et al. (2006) and Ge (2008).”
Does Higher Education Increase Hedonic and Eudaimonic Happiness? (2016, background): “Another non-pecuniary benefit from higher education is that well-educated people, perhaps due to their higher earning potential and higher socio-economic ranking, are more attractive on the competitive marriage market (Becker, 1973; Chiappori et al., 2009).”
It’s Raining Men! Hallelujah? The Long-Run Consequences of Male-Biased Sex Ratios (2019, background): “Past circumstances in the marriage market may also have durably affected the respective incentives to invest in education for women (undermining them) and for men (encouraging them) (Chiappori et al. 2009).”
Gender Differences in Education (2012, unknown): “Others, such as Chiappori et al (2009), build on the assumption that the technological change in the household production decreased the time spent on these activities.”
Determinants of College Major Choice: Identification Using an Information Experiment (2015, unknown): “[(ln k;i ln ~ k;i) (ln k;i ln ~ k;i)] = 0 + 1[(ln w 0 k;i ln w0 ~ k;i) (ln wk;i ln w~ k;i)] + k + 0 k;i k;i; (13)”
Bride Price and Female Education (2020, unknown): “Therefore, the initial match would not be stable (Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss 2009).”
Making Yourself Attractive: Pre-Marital Investments and the Returns to Education in the Marriage Market (2012, background): “Theoretically, this was previously discussed by Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984), Peña (2006), Chiappori et al. (2009) and Browning et al. (2010) but little empirical evidence has so far been provided.”