The Marriage Market, Labor Supply, and Education Choice

By Pierre-Andre Chiappori, Mônica da Costa Heluany Dias, C. Meghir. Journal of Political Economy, 2015

141 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We develop an equilibrium life cycle model of education, marriage, labor supply, and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their investments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market. They then match on the basis of the economic value of marriage and preferences. Equilibrium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following marriage households (married or single) save, supply labor, and consume private and public commodities under uncertainty. Marriage thus has the dual role of providing public goods and offering risk sharing. The model is estimated using the British Household Panel Survey.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/149f88986a5d8a7ed4e5af191ed5e091e0b1d042

Citations in the corpus

• Bride Price and Female Education (2020, unknown): “…find that the average payment at marriage is 420% higher for bride price groups. bride price and female education 603 Iyigun, and Weiss (2009) and Chiappori, Dias, and Meghir (2016), where individuals choose their education before matching in a frictionless marriage market with transferable…”