Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis
By Lars P. Feld, Jean-Robert Tyran. 2002
278 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/33621edae817efdd25ddfa7b08a0a9050401abbb
Citations in the corpus
- Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations (2010, unknown): “See also Feld and Tyran (2002).”
- Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation (2006, unknown): “7 Using Swiss data, Frey and Feld (2002) find that a respectful treatment of taxpayers by the tax administration reduces tax evasion.”
- Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications (2006, unknown): “Figure 2 illustrates the average contribution function of the different types in the experiments of Fischbacher and Gächter (2006). More than half of all subjects are “conditional cooperators”. Twenty-three percent are “free riders”. The rest are either “triangle contributors”, or non-classifiable “”
- Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation (2007, unknown): “In an experimental study, Feld & Tyran (2002) find that tax compliance is higher on average in an endogenous fine treatment in which subjects are allowed to approve or reject the proposal of a fine as compared to an exogenous fine treatment where the fine is imposed by the experimenter (Alm,…”
- Tax morale in Australia: What shapes it and has it changed over time? (2004, unknown): “however, there is very little evidence available on this topic. Feld and Tyran (2002, p. 199) ,”