Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation

By Lars P. Feld, Bruno S. Frey. 2007

757 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2eb0b9eea9183356dba7c3fdda26d69c4ec66f12

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Citations in the corpus

Combining Psychology and Economics in the Analysis of Compliance: From Enforcement to Cooperation (2012, background): “Feld and Frey (2007, 2010) argued that tax compliance can be enhanced by maintaining good relationships between government t, the tax authorities, and taxpayers.”
Progressive taxation and tax morale (2011, neutral): “For example, Slemrod (2003) and Frey and Torgler (2007) use data for Europe and find significant and positive effects of different “trust in state” variables on tax morale.”
Shadow Economy: Estimation Methods, Problems, Results and Open questions (2018, background): “E.g. Feld and Frey (2007), Kirchler (2007), Torgler and Schneider (2009), Feld and Larsen (2005, 2009), Feld and Schneider (2010) (6) Deterrence Despite the strong focus on deterrence in policies fighting the shadow economy and the unambiguous insights of the traditional economic theory of tax…”
Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance: Testing the assumptions of the slippery slope framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and Russia (2013, background): “More specifically, Feld and Frey (2007) show the importance of the relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities, emphasizing that mutual respect increases tax compliance level.”
Estimating the Size of the Shadow Economy: Methods, Problems and Open Questions (2013, neutral): “E.g. Feld and Frey (2007), Kirchler (2007), Torgler and Schneider (2009), Feld and Larsen (2005, 2009) Deterrence Despite the strong focus on deterrence in policies fighting the shadow economy and the unambiguous insights of the traditional economic theory of tax non-compliance, surprisingly little…”
Shadow Economies in Highly Developed OECD Countries: What are the Driving Forces? (2012, background): “Feld and Frey (2007), Kirchler (2007), Torgler and Schneider (2009), Feld and Larsen (2005, 2009)”
Tax Knowledge, Penalties and Tax Compliance in Small and Medium Scale Enterprises in Nigeria (2016, background): “References [34] [36] [37] also found that tax penalty rates have a negative association with tax compliance.”
The Shadow Economy and Work in the Shadow: What Do We (Not) Know? (2012, background): “See Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) for the authoritative survey, Feld and Frey (2007) or Kirchler (2007) for broader interdisciplinary approaches, or the papers by Kirchler, Maciejovsky and Schneider (2003), Kastlunger, Kirchler, Mittore and Pitters (2009), Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2007).”
Determinants of Tax Compliance Intention: Focus on the Theory of Planned Behavior (2020, background): “Aside from the question of the role of enforcement played by the taxing authority, for taxpayers to pay tax voluntarily, it is necessary that they expect an equivalent fiscal exchange between the taxes they pay and the goods and services the government provides (Feld & Frey, 2007).”
Tax evasion, tax morale and policy maker's effectiveness (2009, methodology): “Tax morale is usually defined as “the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes” (Frey, 2002; Torgler, 2007; Feld and Frey, 2007).”
Shedding Light on the Shadow Economy: A Global Database and the Interaction with the Official One (2019, background): “2 Examples of this growing literature include the seminal papers by Schneider and Enste (2000, 2002), Gerxhani (2003), Feld and Schneider (2005, 2010,2011), Hassan and Schneider (2016), Schneider (2017) and Medina and Schneider (2018) 3 For recent debates and controversies compare Kirchgaessner (201”