Signaling in a Global Game: Coordination and Policy Traps

By George-Marios Angeletos, Christian Hellwig, Alessandro Pavan. Journal of Political Economy, 2006

321 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/31fd7c58ab844ac625fb25215c5fa3edffac6727

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Citations in the corpus

Self-Fulfilling Currency Crises: The Role of Interest Rates (2006, background): “Our paper is related also to George-Marios Angeletos et al. (forthcoming, 2006), who consider the informational effects of costly policy measures (Angeletos et al., 2006) or equilibrium dynamics (Angeletos et al., forthcoming).”
Uncertainty and Currency Crises: Evidence from Survey Data (2010, methodology): “To analyze the role of uncertainty during currency crises, we estimate variants of the following equation: ERP = 0 + 1y + 2 (y ) + " , (1) where ERP is an index of the speculative pressures, y represents the expected fundamentals, is a measure of uncertainty, is a threshold separating good from bad ”
Information Manipulation, Coordination and Regime Change (2013, unknown): “Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan (2006) provide a related analysis.”
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs (2010, result): “Third, it is worth pointing out that, although the revolution stage of this model is similar to a global game of regime change (Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan 2006, 2007; Edmond 2007; Morris and Shin 1998, 2000), it is not a global game.”
Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks (2007, background): “Second, whenever β < α(2)/ (2π) the range of z for which (1) and (2) admit multiple solutions shrinks with β, and the distance between the largest and the smallest solutions for any given z also diminishes with β.”
Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises (2014, unknown): “This section of the paper is related to Angeletos et al. (2006), who show that a policy maker’s action can signal aggregate information in a coordination game between agents, in a similar way as the disclosure policy conveys aggregate information in the current paper.”