Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union
By X. Debrun, Laurent Moulin, Alessandro Turrini, Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals, Manmohan S. Kumar. 2008
457 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/30bc4f8b14a12d4aa387f2b589e0dcaf84df7cf1
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In Economics and Econometrics
- V. Grembi
- U. Troiano
- T. Nannicini
- J. Hatchondo
- Leonardo Martinez
- F. Heinemann
- Michael Bergman
- Government Efficienc.
In Political Science and International Relations
Citations in the corpus
- Sub-national deficits in European countries: The impact of fiscal rules and tax autonomy (2014, background): “Similar results are obtained by the study of Debrun et al. (2008), who apply another indicator to capture the strictness of rules across European Union countries.”
- Fiscal Behaviour in the European Union: Rules, Fiscal Decentralization and Government Indebtedness (2009, background): “Debrun and Kumar (2007) and Debrun et al. (2008) also report that stricter and broader fiscal rules are associated with higher cyclically adjusted primary balances and that lower cyclically adjusted primary balances are also observed in election years.”
- The Political Economy of Government Debt (2015, unknown): “Debrun et al. (2008) are fully aware of this problem and attempt to instrument their index of stringency of rules with some institutional variables but the exclusionary restriction is highly questionable. Miano (2015) shows how the adopting of various budget institutions are endogenous to a host of ”
- Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience (2013, unknown): “, Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1994; Alt and Lowry, 1994; Poterba, 1994; Bohn and Inman, 1996), European countries (see, e.g., Ayuso-i-Casals et al., 2007; Debrun et al., 2008; Foremny, 2011) and Italian municipalities (Grembi et al.”
- Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium (2022, background): “Several empirical studies find that well designed fiscal rules are associated with stronger fiscal performance (Corbacho and Schwartz, 2007; Debrun and Kumar, 2007; Debrun et al., 2008; Deroose et al., 2006; EC, 2006; Kopits, 2004).”
- Do Fiscal Rules Matter (2016, methodology): “12 This is consistent with the aforementioned Alesina and Tabellini (1990); Persson and Svensson (1989); Aghion and Bolton (1990); Besley (2007); Battaglini and Coate (2008); and Song, Soresletten, and Zilibotti (2012). Other political economy models on deficit determination include Tabellini and Al”
- Do Fiscal Rules Constrain Fiscal Policy? A Meta-Regression-Analysis (2015, background): “Politicians’ and voters’ myopia, possibly reinforced by political instability or polarisation, may lead to a long-run unsustainable level of public debt (for a survey on the political economy of public deficits see Imbeau, 2005; Debrun et al., 2008).”
- Promoting sustainable public finances in the European Union: The role of fiscal rules and government efficiency (2016, methodology): “…And previous research finds evidence that sustainable public finances in Europe may be associated with strong fiscal rules (see, for example, Debrun et al. 2008; Afonso and Hauptmeier, 2009; Dahan and Strawczynski, 2010; Foremny, 2014; HolmHadulla, Hauptmeier and Rother, 2012; Nerlich and…”