Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional Economics

By E. Furubotn, R. Richter. 2005

1,280 citations recorded by the source corpus.

A much-needed exploration of the New Institutional Economics, or NIE, including a critical assessment of its central theoretical contributions since the field's early beginnings in the 1960s, is this book's objective. It traces the development of major ideas about the genesis and significance of institutions as these ideas have been presented in the NIE. Given the fundamental understanding underlying work in this new area of research--that transactions involve the use of real resources and have costs--the book views the NIE as an amalgam of transaction-cost economics, property-rights analysis, and contract theory. Efforts are made to explain how the various theoretical strands discussed in the NIE literature fit into the general fabric of modern institutionalism, and how the new concepts put forward can be applied to institutional analysis. Since the new institutionalist approach contrasts sharply with that of the traditional neoclassical model, special attention is given to elucidating the points of difference between the two. And, along these lines, a final chapter deals with the troubling question of whether neoinstitutionalist theory can be advanced by efforts to extend or generalize neoclassical theory. The book will be essential reading for economists attracted to the NIE approach. In addition, scholars from such disciplines as political science, sociology, and law will find the work useful as the NIE continues to gain wide academic acceptance. Eirik G. Furubotn is currently serving as Research Associate, University of Texas at Arlington; he recently retired as James L. West Professor of Economics, Texas A&M University. Rudolf Richter is Professor of Economics, Center for the Study of the New Institutional Economics, University of Saarlandes.

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Citations in the corpus

Smart cities in the new service economy: building platforms for smart services (2013, background): “On the other hand, consumer electronic networks funnel consumer instructions, expectations and understandings, creating opportunities for shared service experiences (de Man 2004, 4; Bessant and Tidd 2007, 85; Furubotn and Richter 2005, 308–310).”
Why Do Aid Agencies Exist (2005, unknown): “There is no single and generally accepted definition of transaction costs in the New Institutional Economics literature (Furubotn & Richter, 1998; Masten & Williamson, 1999).”
The institutional approach to entrepreneurship research. Introduction (2008, unknown): “Int Entrep Manag J (2008) 4:365–379 371 Furubotn and Richter 1991, 1997 ).”
The Theoretical Foundation of Industrial Relations and its Implications for Labor Economics and Human Resource Management (2010, background): “…ciently allocates resources independently of the specifi cation of property rights, other institutional rules and mechanisms, and social structure (Furubotn and Richter 2005: 12–14).15 This means that labor demand and supply handle all aspects of HRM (e.g., DS set wages, provide a workforce,…”
Rural development through the construction of new, nested, markets: comparative perspectives from China, Brazil and the European Union (2012, background): “The social relations between the actors and the adopted governance structures are not merely of economic value (see Furubotn and Richter 2005 ); nested markets often emerge out of (as much as they are an expression of) a critique on the relations that dominate the general food markets.”
Property Rights Reform in Rangeland China: Dilemmas On the Road to the Household Ranch (2003, background): “In the presence of imperfect information and positive transaction costs, the property rights associated with Paretooptimality cannot be used as a benchmark for efficiency and it becomes more meaningful to gauge the ‘‘efficiency’’ of an institutional arrangement through comparing it with other, real ”
The economics of energy service contracts (2007, unknown): “The term transaction refers to the transfer of goods, services or property rights, whether externally within markets or internally within organisations (Furubotn and Richter, 1997).”