The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929

By S. Haber, Armando Razo, Noel Maurer. 2003

236 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3004e44242cfee000c12e6ab80648b8ebad67bb2

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Citations in the corpus

The corporate governance of banks (2003, background): “Thus, the goal is to create mechanisms that negate the “grabbing hand” of politicians and regulators while creating incentives for official agencies to improve social welfare (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Haber et al, 2003).”
Bank Supervision and Corruption in Lending (2006, background): “Thus, if bank supervisory agencies have the power to discipline non-compliant banks, then politicians and supervisors may use this power to induce banks to divert the flow of credit to politically connected firms (Becker and Stigler, 1974; Stigler, 1975; Haber et al., 2003).”
The Rule of Law and Economic Development (2008, background): “Moreover, the analysis of corruption underscores an important ambiguity in the property rights approach (Keefer 2004, Haber et al. 2003).”
Finance and Inequality: Theory and Evidence (2009, unknown): “…is not embodied in individuals.2 2 An implicit assumption underlying this analysis is that the concentration of capital ownership does not distort resource allocation or the policies that influence resource allocation, but see Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) and Haber, Razo, and Maurer (2003).”
Political Order and One-Party Rule (2010, background): “For example, Haber et al. (2003) suggest that dictators can solve the credible-commitment problem through social networks and through 130 Magaloni · Kricheli A nn u.”
Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse (2011, background): “Mexico’s first resource boom ended after it had exhausted its oil reserves, given the technology of the time (Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003), but Polity did not increase in the wake of this resource bust, as predicted by the theory of the resource curse.”
Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies (2011, background): “Based on the experience of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico, both Haber et al. (2003) and Magaloni (2006) emphasize the historical determination of ruling parties in non-democracies, showing how their role in guaranteeing the security of property rights for a narrow elite may”