Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies

By Scott Gehlbach, Philip E. Keefer. 2011

363 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/72d8e8d6a7750447f3b75257756a9fdcd88a3628

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Raul Caruso
2. Isabela Mares

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Raul Caruso
2. Isabela Mares

Citations in the corpus

• Response to David J. Samuels and Ben W. Ansell’s review of From Open Secrets to Secret Voting: Democratic Electoral Reforms and Voter Autonomy (2014, background): “Recent work on autocratic regimes has not questioned this view (see e.g. Gehlbach and Keefer (2011)).”
• The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (2012, background): “Gehlbach and Keefer (2009), for example, argue that when autocrats allow ruling party members to share information about autocrat behavior that is not available to others, members can act collectively to punish leader expropriation of their investments.”