Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction - Second Edition

By Herbert Gintis. 2009

545 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2f0be0a05cb132facde293fe271b183e50d2dc54

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In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Proactive Resource Management for LTE in Unlicensed Spectrum: A Deep Learning Perspective (2017, methodology): “sults in disutility for inequity-averse agents. The HE concept comes from the anthropological literature in which Homo sapiens evolved in small hunter-gatherer groups without a centralized governance [20]. In fact, we incorporate the notion of airtime fairness in the modeling of our HE agents. The a”
Learning to compete, coordinate, and cooperate in repeated games using reinforcement learning (2011, methodology): “For example, the folk theorem states that many repeated games have an inﬁnite number of NE of the repeated game (rNE) (Gintis 2000).”
Forecasting Decisions in Conflict Situations: A Comparison of Game Theory, Role-playing, and Unaided Judgement (2002, background): “Ironical- conflicts of these types than they were for the ly, even if such a distinction could be made in advance, Gintis (2000) suggested that game 6theory may not add value, because, in situations Personal communication from Herbert Gintis, 15 June in which it is likely to help make accurate…”
Rethinking the Theoretical Foundation of Sociobiology (2007, background): “A similar problem exists with evolutionary models that are not explicitly genetic, such as game theory models, which assume that the various individual strategies “breed true” in some general sense (Maynard Smith 1982; Gintis 2000).”
Agent-Based Modeling: A New Approach for Theory Building in Social Psychology (2007, unknown): ““Evolutionary game theory” (Maynard Smith, 1982; Gintis, 2000) examines the outcomes as a changing and adapting population of agents interacts with each other and with an environment over many simulated generations, and analyzes the agent strategies that fare best in such competition.”
Dynamic spectrum access in open spectrum wireless networks (2006, methodology): “In many decision-making and strategy-setting people do not behave like the self-interested “rational” actor depicted in neoclassical economics and classical game theory [5].”
Evolutionary Game Theory and Adaptive Dynamics of Continuous Traits (2007, background): “Economists too have realized the power of this evolutionary approach to game theory and incorporated it into their work (Fudenberg & Harris 1992, Gintis 2000, Hofbauer 1996).”
Do sincere apologies need to be costly? Test of a costly signaling model of apology (2009, unknown): “A similar idea was proposed by an economist, Nelson (1974), to explain the utility of dissipative advertisements, whose cost, he supposed, is offset by repeat purchases only when the advertiser produces a high-quality good (see also Gintis, 2000, chapter 13).”
The (mis)estimation of neighborhood effects: causal inference for a practicable social epidemiology. (2004, unknown): “…(1987), Manski (Manski, 1993b, a, 1995, 2000), Arrow (1971, 1994), Akerlof (1970, 1976, 1980, 1997); Bowles and Gintis (Bowles & Gintis, 1977, 2000; Gintis, 2000; Bowles & Gintis, 2002), Shively (Shively, 1974, 1987; Achen & Shively, 1995), and King (1997)—have ably addressed related questions…”
Northwest coast indigenous institutions that supported resilience and sustainability (2002, result): “Evidence from laboratory experiments with human subjects have shown that simple models of self-interest are not consistent with the behavior of participants, further demonstrating the need to investigate reciprocity (Hoffman et al., 1998; Gintis, 2000 ).”
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics as the New Mainstream? (2007, background): “Furthermore, game theory has revealed that standard neoclassical definitions of rationality are problematic, and in some contexts rationality has ambiguous outcomes (Sugden, 1991; Hargreaves and Varoufakis, 1995; Gintis, 2000).”
Extended Replicator Dynamics as a Key to Reinforcement Learning in Multi-agent Systems (2003, background): “For the second game we considered the battle of the sexes game, defined by the following payoff matrices [13,3]: ( 2 0 0 1 )”