Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords

By Gagan Aggarwal, Ashish Goel, Rajeev Motwani. ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2006

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Optimized Cost per Click in Taobao Display Advertising (2017, background): “Although advertisers assume less risk with CPS [7, 2, 21], compared to CPC, CPS ignores the value of clicks, providing worse traﬃc liquidating eﬃciency.”
Efficient Ranking in Sponsored Search (2011, background): “While the second-price rule amounts to the Vickrey payment with a single slot, this is no longer the case with multiple slots, and it is well-known that for K > 1 sponsored search auctions are not truthful [1].”
AdWords and generalized on-line matching (2005, background): “Furthermore, the explicit form of incentive compatible payments for ranking auctions is carried out in [ AGM06 , IK06].”
The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations (2009, background): “Some of the features that have been considered (or ignored) in the models [20, 8, 19, 16, 18, 4, 7, 17, 1, 9] include: online vs. oﬄine or equilibrium properties, algorithm design vs mechanism design, single keyword vs multiple keywords, incorporating budgets or not, and pay per click vs pay per…”