Who cares about corruption?
By Alvaro Cuervo‐Cazurra. 2006
801 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2e0bc454843e733cfb311693359402dbb989b39b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Information Systems
- Sorin M. S. Krammer
- K. Meyer
- Jing-Lin Duanmu
- Ling Liu
- J. Godinez
- Alvaro Cuervo‐Cazurra
- S. Lundan
- M. Genc
In Sociology and Political Science
- Sorin M. S. Krammer
- Seung-Hyun Lee
- David H. Weng
- Alvaro Cuervo‐Cazurra
- K. Meyer
- M. Genc
- Jing-Lin Duanmu
- Evis Sinani
In Strategy and Management
- K. Meyer
- Mike W. Peng
- Alvaro Cuervo‐Cazurra
- Grazia D. Santangelo
- Rajneesh Narula
- Yadong Luo
- John H. Dunning
- S. Lundan
Citations in the corpus
- A Panel Data Analysis of Locational Determinants of Chinese and Indian Outward Foreign Direct Investment (2009, positive): “Alvaro (2006) found that corruption results in relatively lower FDI from countries that have signed the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, but relatively higher FDI from coun”
- Transforming disadvantages into advantages: developing-country MNEs in the least developed countries (2008, positive): “As a result, developing-country MNEs are more used to paying in order to secure permits and win contracts, which can help them achieve an edge in LDCs with high corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006).”
- Does bribery in the home country promote or dampen firm exports (2013, background): “To the extent that bribery can be ’“seen as facilitating transactions and speeding up procedures” (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006: 808), it may work around domestic regulations and improve a firm’s position within the home country.”
- Corruption Distance and FDI Flows into Latin America (2015, background): “On the other hand, firms which originated in highly corrupt environments may not be as sensitive to high corruption levels abroad; they may be attracted by the environment and even take advantage of corrupt activities (Suchman, 1995; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006).”
- Greasing the Wheels of Change: Bribery, Institutions, and New Product Introductions in Emerging Markets (2019, background): “In emerging markets, corruption remains a ubiquitous feature of doing business (Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Husted, 1999; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Olken, 2009; Jeong & Weiner, 2012), and the use of bribes by both domestic and foreign firms is frequently reported in the press(1).”
- The Impact of the home country on internationalization (2018, background): “More recently, studies have paid attention to the impact of homecountry characteristics on a firm’s innovations and foreign expansion (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; CuervoCazurra & Genc, 2008, 2011; del Sol & Kogan, 2007; Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008; Govindarajan & Ramamurti, 2011; Holburn & Zelner,…”
- Taxes, corruption, and entry (2016, neutral): “These coefficients present correlations between WGI and CPI.”
- Do cross-border mergers and acquisitions increase short-term market performance? The case of Chinese firms (2017, background): “It refers to the degree of political stability within a country, the quality of the laws, regulations, administrative procedures and policies formally sanctioned by the government (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; 2008; Delios & Henisz, 2003).”
- High-level politically connected firms, corruption, and analyst forecast accuracy around the world (2010, background): “In a reversed direction, Robertson and Watson (2004) find that a large increase in FDI flowing into a country results in a higher level of corruption, because the new FDI inflow represents eagerness on the part of foreign firms and so expands the opportunities for bribery.”
- The effectiveness of laws against bribery abroad (2008, background): “…to studies of corruption, which have discussed how corruption in the host country reduces FDI and changes the behavior of the foreign investor (e.g. Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Lambsdorf, 2003; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck & Eden, 2005; Smarzynska & Wei, 2000; Svaleryd, Hakkala, &…”