Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency: Evidence from Indonesia

By Christian Leuz, Felix Oberholzer-Gee. 2006

153 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2cb315a947e2d0a103f0e18e529026820370c6d7

Citations in the corpus

• Political Connections and Allocative Distortions (2015, unknown): “The fundamental challenge in identifying the underlying mechanism is that politically 1Roberts (1990), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Jayachandran (2006), Faccio (2006), Ferguson and Voth (2008), Bunkanawanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), Faccio and Parsley (2009), Goldman et al. (2009), Cooper et al.…”
• Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Political Risk: Measurement and Effects (2016, unknown): “Another closely related literature studies the value of connections to powerful politicians (Fisman (2001); Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006); Johnson and Mitton (2003); Khwaja and Mian (2005); Ace- moglu et al. (2016); Cooper et al. (2010); Acemoglu et al. (2016); Roberts (1990); Jayachandran…”
• The cost of pride: Why do firms from developing countries bid higher? (2011, unknown): “(see Loewenstein (2000) and Lerner and Keltner (2000) for extensive references to this 5 The link to empire building can also be found in the literature on global diversification, which points towards the existence of a geographic diversification discount (e.”
• Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, unknown): “…literature shows that political connections are valuable resources to individual firms in both developing and developed countries and are important domestic arrangements affecting firms’ strategic choices (e.g., Faccio 2006; Goldman et al. 2009; Guedhami et al. 2014; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006).”
• Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, unknown): “The literature also argues that shareholders in PCFs gain from the close ties to politicians (e.g., Fisman, 2001; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006 for Indonesia; Johnson and Mitton, 2003 for Malaysia).”
• Public governance and corporate finance: Evidence from corruption cases (2008, unknown): “…explains firm behavior and value, financial sector development, and economic growth (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994, 1998; Fisman, 2001; Johnson et al., 2002; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Ramalho, 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Faccio, 2006; Charumilind et al., 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).”
• The Role of Stock Ownership by US Members of Congress on the Market for Political Favors (2014, unknown): “…Dinç 2005; Khwaja and Mian 2005; Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar 2006; Faccio 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell 2006; Jayachandran 2006; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Claessens, Feijen, Laeven 2008; Desai and Olofsgard 2008; Ramanna 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2008, 2009; Cole 2009;…”
• Using Organization Structure to Buffer Political Ties in Emerging Markets: A Case Study (2012, unknown): “…of political behavior in these countries cannot be obtained without incurring significant risks – for example, when regime changes take place (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Siegel, 2007) or political agents extract excessive rents from the benefiting firms (Fan, Won & Zhang, 2007; Shleifer…”
• Property rights protection, corporate transparency, and growth (2009, unknown): “…hand, the benefits of corporate transparency are lower in markets with greater risks of government intervention, that is, when property rights are less secure (Watts and Zimmerman (1978 and 1986), Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006), Stulz (2005), Durnev and Fauver (2008), Durnev and Guriev (2008)).”
• Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment (2015, unknown): “Politically connected firms have easier and preferential access to financing (Boubakri et al., 2012; Claessens et al., 2008; Fraser et al., 2006; Hassan et al., 2012; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), are highly leveraged (Fraser et al., 2006), and have longer debt maturities (Boubakri et al., 2012).”