Public governance and corporate finance: Evidence from corruption cases

By Joseph P. H. Fan, Oliver M. Rui, Mengxin Zhao. 2008

341 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/05f0980ac359b19b2f9e083a65ba589dab216a86

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Gary Gang Tian
2. Kam C. Chan
3. Sofia Johan
4. Zhifeng Yang
5. Xiaofei Pan
6. Zhihong Chen
7. Bin Ke
8. Wenfeng Wu

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Gary Gang Tian
2. Xiaofei Pan
3. Wenfeng Wu
4. Sofia Johan
5. Jinsong Tan
6. Qinyuan Chen
7. Heng Yue
8. Zhifeng Yang

Citations in the corpus

• Corporate finance and governance in emerging markets: A selective review and an agenda for future research (2011, background): “…that firm owners and managers may bribe or build connections with bureaucrats who can influence state banks to give loans and other business privileges to these firms (e.g., Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Khawaja and Mian, 2005; Charumilind et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2008).”
• Does Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Matter in China? Evidence from Financing and Investment Choices in the High-Tech Industry (2014, neutral): “…level of government corruption control index has no effect on informal financing; but it has a negative effect on bank financing as China’s banking system is dominated by government owned banks and corruption cases occur frequently in China’s banking system, as shown by Fan, Rui, and Zhao (2008).”
• Government Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms (2013, neutral): “5 For instance, politically-connected firms have better access to loans (Li et al. 2008, Claessens et al. 2008, Fan et al. 2008), have favorable access to equity markets (Francis et al. 2009, Boubakri et al. 2012), have more confidence in the legal system in transitional countries (Li et al. 2008),…”
• Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud (2014, methodology): “Following Fan et al. (2008), we define a CEO as politically connected if he or she is currently serving or has formerly served in the government or the military.”
• Ownership, Institutions, and Capital Structure: Evidence from China (2009, background): “6 Fan et al. (2006) offer another potential explanation for our finding of high levels of short-term debt in Chinese firms.”
• Minority Shareholders’ Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection Countries: A Natural Experiment from China (2013, background): “7 Prior China related event studies also use relatively long periods to measure abnormal returns (e.g., Fan et al. 2008; Berkman et al. 2010).”
• In the name of charity: Political connections and strategic corporate social responsibility in a transition economy (2015, background): “Chinese listed companies are different from their peers in ownership and governance structures (Fan et al., 2008; Kim and Jiang, 2014; Lin et al., 2012).”
• Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China (2016, background): “Fan et al. (2008) examine the impact on firm leverage and stock prices in China after the arrest of corrupt officials with political connections to firms.”