Board Independence and CEO Turnover: board independence and ceo turnover

By Volker Laux. 2008

167 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c03295ea7a0a15bce9219de2171edda76a8fa48

Citations in the corpus

• What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings. (2013, unknown): “…most of the supervisory based models examine the way in which the board’s monitoring intensity affects the board’s decision to retain or fire the CEO (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Almazan and Suarez, 2003; Graziano and Luporini, 2003; Hermalin, 2005; Dominguez-Martinez et al., 2008; Laux, 2008).”
• Director Ownership, Governance, and Performance (2013, unknown): “Laux (2008) presents a model considering CEO turnover and board independence, and shows that greater board independence might be detrimental to the firm because independent boards might be too active in replacing the CEO and in formulating CEO compensation.”