Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals

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Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game (2009, methodology): “…and her results suggest that the long–run mechanism may increase cooperation more than the short–run mechanism.3 We know of only one paper attempting a direct comparison of cheap talk and the kind of observation we study: Duffy and Feltovich (2006), who did so using a two–player prisoners’ dilemma.”
When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory (2007, background): “Concentrating on a set-up not afflicted by such issues of credibility, Duffy and Feltovich (2002, 2005) study the impact of words and deeds and lies on behavior in prominent strategic situations, including the stag-hunt game.”
Voting to Tell Others (2014, background): “This manipulation, which was crossed with all other manipulations, did not have a significant effect on survery take-up for either voters or non-voters. vote in the 2010 congressional election.”