Market discipline of bank risk: Evidence from subordinated debt contracts

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How researchers see this paper

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Who Disciplines Bank Managers? (2009, unknown): “According to the charter value literature (Goyal, 2005), however, a high share of core deposits to total assets can help curb bank managers’ risk taking and consequently decrease the likelihood of a forced turnover.”
Liquidity Risk Management and Credit Supply in the Financial Crisis (2011, unknown): “However, restrictive covenants have been found to be more common in debt contracts when banks are riskier (see Goyal, 2005; Ashcraft, 2008).”
Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements (2009, unknown): “…why borrowers and lenders write into contracts various contingencies, such as covenants (e.g., Smith and Warner, 1979; Malitz, 1986; Begley, 1994; Goyal, 2005; Nash, Netter, and Poulson, 2003; Bradley and Roberts, 2003) and performance pricing (e.g., Beatty, Dichev, and Weber, 2002; Asquith,…”
The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants (2015, methodology): “In another context, Goyal (2001) analyzes bank issuances of The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants”
Bank reputation in the private debt market (2010, background): “In general, researchers consider covenants and co-agents as substitutes from the perspective of mitigating asymmetries within loan syndicates (Goyal, 2005).”
Self-Selection Models in Corporate Finance (2005, unknown): “SPLi = γsZsi + ψsi (34) DIVi = γdZdi + ψdi (35)”