The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants
By M. Bradley, Michael R. Roberts. 2015
612 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/099d47ddafe990455b863ef903b53e37f7708cc5
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Michael R. Roberts
- Hans B. Christensen
- Valeri V. Nikolaev
- V. Acharya
- Anna M. Costello
- J. Murfin
- Amir Sufi
- Sudheer Chava
In Finance
- Michael R. Roberts
- Valeri V. Nikolaev
- Hans B. Christensen
- Victoria Ivashina
- V. Acharya
- Sudheer Chava
- David Marqués-Ibáñez
- J. Murfin
Citations in the corpus
- Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans (2007, background): “Bradley and Roberts (2003) use Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan and find that smaller firms, firms with higher growth opportunities, and highly levered firms are more likely to have loans with covenants.”
- Competition and the Cost of Debt (2012, neutral): “This finding is consistent with evidence by MacKay and Phillips (2005) and in line with theories by Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988).”
- The Information Content of Bank Loan Covenants (2010, neutral): “6 For more detailed discussion of these covenants, see Bradley and Roberts (2004).”
- Who Uses Financial Reports and for What Purpose? Evidence from Capital Providers (2014, neutral): “The most common financial covenants are those based on net worth, working capital, leverage, interest coverage and cash flow (Citron, 1992b; Bradley and Roberts, 2004; Gârleanu and Zwiebel, 2009), though debt/EBITDA covenants are increasingly popular (Demiroglu and James, 2010).”
- The impact of climate change on the cost of bank loans (2020, positive): “consistent with the prior literature (Bradley and Roberts 2015; Chava et al. 2009; Chava 2014).”
- The "Dominant Bank Effect:" How High Lender Reputation Affects the Information Content and Terms of Bank Loans (2010, background): “31 Demiroglu and James (2007) provide evidence that covenants convey private information about the borrower’s business prospects, while Bradley and Roberts (2004) present results suggesting covenants are a means of mitigating borrower agency costs.”
- Environmental Externalities and Cost of Capital (2011, methodology): “Manufacturing accounts for the highest percentage of the sample, at 16%, where as telephone and television transmission sector accounts for only 3.1% of the sample.”
- The Supply-Side Determinants of Loan Contract Strictness (2012, background): “Bradley and Roberts’ (2004) covenant intensity index, for example, captures this idea, although they also consider non-financial covenants.”
- Mitigating Incentive Conflicts in Inter-Firm Relationships: Evidence from Long-Term Supply Contracts (2013, background): “Finally, I include a control for cash flow volatility because Crocker and Masten (1988) and Bradley and Roberts (2004) suggest that the parties will include provisions that allow for flexibility in response to future uncertainty.17 The results of the Probit estimation of equation (2) are presented…”
- Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures (2005, neutral): “As Houston and James (1996) and Bradley and Roberts (2003) show, the majority of corporate debt is comprised of private placements.28 In addition to the four basic types of financing spikes, we examine two additional measures of capital structure adjustment that we refer to as leverage increasing…”
- Why Do Loans Contain Covenants? Evidence from Lending Relationships (2017, neutral): “As long as the current lender is not the one See Bradley and Roberts (2004), Chava and Roberts (2008), Roberts and Sufi (2009a), Nini et al.”
- On the value of restrictive covenants: Empirical investigation of public bond issues (2014, neutral): “Goyal (2003) and Bradley and Roberts (2004) results suggest that restrictive covenants and yields are determined jointly.”
- Capital versus Performance Covenants in Debt Contracts (2012, positive): “In addition, whereas prior research documents a positive association between the number of accounting covenants and leverage (Press and Weintrop 1990; Duke and Hunt 1990; Skinner 1993; Bradley and Roberts 2004), this relationship does not hold for C-Covenants, further underscoring the difference bet”