Privatization and Corporate Governance : Principles, Evidence, and Future Challenges

By Alexander Dyck. 2001

165 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Unless developing countries embrace a corporate governance perspective, privatization is unlikely to provide the benefits of improved performance with accountability. This article introduces the concept of governance chains that can constrain the grabbing hands of public and private actors by providing information and accountability mechanisms to help investors monitor managers. Empirical data on established firms from 49 countries provide estimates of the relative importance and strength of private and formal chains of governance. The framework and empirical benchmarks help explain the outcomes of past privatizations and suggest certain steps that governments can pursue to be sure to get the most out of future privatization activity.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/28a5e1dc0f67e3b5c72cc8d4dcdd35d1f6a1627d

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Citations in the corpus

Postprivatization Corporate Governance: The Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection (2005, unknown): “Likewise, Dyck and Zingales (2002) show that privatizations are more likely to occur through private sales and ownership is more concentrated in countries where private benefits of control are larger, i.”
Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners (2009, background): “, 1998 and Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Reinforcing that insiders have stronger motives to obscure firm performance when they are siphoning more value, Leuz et al. (2003) find that earnings management is more pervasive in countries with weak investor protection.”
Do state and foreign ownership affect investment efficiency? Evidence from privatizations (2017, unknown): “In the context of privatization, NPFs are better governed when foreign investors, who require more informative disclosures and maintain strict control of managers’ actions, own larger stakes (e.g., Dyck, 2001; Boubakri et al., 2007).”
Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, unknown): “, these firms require close monitoring to prevent the diversion of corporate resources (Dyck, 2001).”
Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition (2009, unknown): “…investors ownership on firm performance with all accounting measures at the five and ten percent levels, which tend to be consistent with the theoretical contentions of Boycko et al. (1996) and Dyck (2001) that foreign investors are the source of better governance and higher firm performance.”
The Role of State and Foreign Owners in Corporate Risk-Taking: Evidence from Privatization (2013, unknown): “Second, following Faccio et al. (2011), we additionally introduce two institutional variables, namely, ACC an index driven from Kurtzman et al.”