A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space

By Peter R. Wurman, Michael P. Wellman, William E. Walsh. Games Econ. Behav., 2001

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A survey of multi-agent organizational paradigms (2004, background): “Many other types of auctions exist to service the di ﬀ erent needs of di ﬀ erent communities , each with their own characteristics ( Wurman et al ., 2001; Kurbel & Loutchko , 2003).”
Argumentation-based negotiation (2003, background): “…referring to concepts of the environment, the diﬀerent agents, 9 There are other ways in which a negotiation framework can be viewed abstractly , such as those presented by Bartolini et al. (2002) and Wurman et al. (2001), which view auction frameworks in terms of the rules that parametrise them.”
Economics and Electronic Commerce: Survey and Directions for Research (2001, background): “develop a standard way to describe auction rules based on an object-oriented framework [405].”
Combinatorial auctions (2007, unknown): “For a fuller treatment of auction classification, we refer the reader to (EngelBrecht-Wiggans, 1980) and (Wurman et al., 2001).”