An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives

By P. Courty, G. Marschke. Journal of Labor Economics, 2004

201 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/283dfdc66e65b98e413f37b2be8ff51d078dbf54

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Citations in the corpus

Performance-Based Funding in American Higher Education: A Systematic Synthesis of the Intended and Unintended Consequences (2020, background): “…individuals to fall outside of the group being measured, or focusing only on the cases that are on the margin of success to the detriment of other individuals (Chakrabarti, 2013; Courty et al., 2011; Courty & Marschke, 2004; Koning & Heinrich, 2013; Performance-Based Funding Lauen & Gaddis, 2016).”
Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems (2010, methodology): “These findings corroborate their previous work 13 They also show that a measure is distorted if its correlation with value decreases with activation (Courty and Marschke, 2004) that used the specific rules of the performance measurement system to demonstrate the existence of distortions in JTPA…”
Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation (2010, background): “For evidence of agents gaming explicit incentives see Oyer (1998) and Courty and Marschke (2004). For other examples of empirical research that document the implicit incentives of career concerns see Gibbons and Murphy (1992); Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996); Graham (1999); Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (200”
Interim Rank, Risk Taking, and Performance in Dynamic Tournaments (2012, background): “…to understanding how the behavior of individuals is affected by tournaments (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) and other performance evaluation schemes (Oyer, 1998; Lazear, 2000; Courty and Marschke, 2004; Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2007).”
The Use and Usefulness of Performance Measures in the Public Sector (2003, background): “Courty and Marschke (2004) find further evidence of such gaming behaviour and show that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organisation.”
Cream Skimming, Parking, and Other Intended and Unintended Effects of High-Powered, Performance-Based Contracts (2013, background): “Although there is some evidence that these contracts increase measured performance, they are often accompanied by various distortionary effects (Courty & Marschke, 2004; Courty, Kim, & Marschke, 2011; McBeath & Meezan, 2010).”