Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program

By Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, S. Chomsisengphet, T. Landvoigt, Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru, Vincent Yao. 2015

151 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8e0b73a62b90cc0b3262105875f63592f5a152e9

Citations in the corpus

• Housing Wealth Effects: The Long View (2018, unknown): “, Agarwal et al., 2017; Berger et al., 2017; Chen, Michaux, and Roussanov, 2013; Davis and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2015; Gorea and Midrigan, 2017; Guren, Krishnamurthy, and McQuade, 2018; Kaplan, Mitman, and Violante, 2017; Li and Yao, 2007).5 In Sections 6 and 7, we lay out such a model — which we refer ”
• Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks (2018, unknown): “2016, Agarwal et al. 2015 and 2017).”
• Inattention and Inertia in Household Finance: Evidence from the Danish Mortgage Market (2015, unknown): “Finally, our results imply that the effect of expansionary monetary policy on household consumption is weakened in economies with predominantly fixed-rate mortgages, not only by barriers to refinancing that may result from low credit scores and house prices, as emphasized by Agarwal et al. (2015), B”
• Regional Heterogeneity and Monetary Policy (2019, unknown): “Agarwal et al. (2015) use detailed data from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program 6There is also a growing literature specifically studying the effects of QE.”
• How Quantitative Easing Works: Evidence on the Refinancing Channel (2016, unknown): “This policy intervention is substantially different from HARP; whereas HARP relaxed the requirements to qualify for a refinance loans, it prohibited borrowers from extracting any equity out of their homes (see Amromin and Kearns, 2014 and Agarwal et al. 2017). Third, borrowers with LTV higher than 8”
• Do Banks Pass Through Credit Expansions to Consumers Who Want to Borrow (2015, unknown): “…3 .0 4 .0 5 2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1 2012m1 2013m1 Time Operational Expenses as share of ADB Smoothed Operational Expenses .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 2008m1 2009m1 2010m1 2011m1 2012m1 2013m1 (Rewards & Fraud Expense) / Interchange Income Note: Figure corresponds to Figure A.I in Agarwal et al. (2015b).”
• Mortgage Design in an Equilibrium Model of the Housing Market (2018, unknown): “Similarly, studies that exploit quasi-random variation in housing market interventions durring the Great Recession such as the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) (Agarwal et al. (2020)) and the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) (Agarwal et al. (2017), Ganong and Noel (2020)) find tha”