Drammer: Deterministic Rowhammer Attacks on Mobile Platforms

By Victor van der Veen, Yanick Fratantonio, Martina Lindorfer, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice, Giovanni Vigna, Herbert Bos, Kaveh Razavi, Cristiano Giuffrida. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2016

389 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2612541a89857949bc512b6fb2ad7f0c153cb97c

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Citations in the corpus

RowHammer: A Retrospective (2019, background): “This DRAM failure mode is now popularly called RowHammer [1], [2], [23], [37], [90], [130], [140], [205], [213], [214], [239], [244].”
Error Characterization, Mitigation, and Recovery in Flash-Memory-Based Solid-State Drives (2017, methodology): “…by exploiting the RowHammer read disturb mechanism, a user-level program can gain kernel-level privileges on real laptop systems [164, 165], take over a server vulnerable to RowHammer [57], take over a victim virtual machine running on the same system [7], and take over a mobile device [181].”
Plundervolt: Software-based Fault Injection Attacks against Intel SGX (2020, background): “, for privilege escalation [60, 22, 77, 74], injecting faults into cryptographic primitives [55, 6], or reading otherwise inaccessible memory locations [44].”
RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load (2019, background): “This discloses the physical addresses of pages in our own process, which is important information to mount other attacks (such as Rowhammer attacks [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59]).”
SGX-Bomb: Locking Down the Processor via Rowhammer Attack (2017, background): “, making a page table entry writable by a user process [31]) not only requires controlling of memory allocation to place the target memory pages into vulnerable DRAM rows, but also requires flipping a specific bit (or bits) for a reliable attack [34].”
Retrospective: Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors (2023, neutral): “We also analyzed approximate methods which further reduce the storage requirement: Bloom Filters [11], Morris Coun-ters [50], and variants thereof [18, 21, 66].”
Processing Data Where It Makes Sense: Enabling In-Memory Computation (2019, background): “ machine can take over another virtual machine by inducing errors in the victim virtual machine’s memory space [129]; a malicious applicationwithoutpermissionscantakecontrolofan Android mobile device [130]; or an attacker can gain arbitrary read/write access in a web browser on a Microsoft Windows 1”
TRRespass: Exploiting the Many Sides of Target Row Refresh (2020, methodology): “However, while it is widely cited in the literature [7], [27], [28], [56], [66], [81], [89], [91], very little is actually known about the pTRR mechanism.”