The Role of Annuity Markets in Financing Retirement.
By M. Murthi. 2003
140 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/25e382bbada1c4f9f3e389a17b9cb6b448556c95
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Olivia S. Mitchell
- C. Turra
- Anna Lusardi
- Jing Jian Xiao
- M.C.J. van Rooij
- Rob J M Alessie
- Milo Bianchi
- Vilsa E. Curto
In Economics and Econometrics
- Olivia S. Mitchell
- C. Turra
- Anna Lusardi
- M.C.J. van Rooij
- Jing Jian Xiao
- Joanne Yoong
- Rob J M Alessie
- H. Gaudecker
In General Health Professions
Citations in the corpus
- The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (2007, unknown): “The high wealth equivalents in these papers in turn implies a very high rate of voluntary annuitization, giving rise to what is known as the annuity puzzle since, empirically, very few individuals voluntarily purchase annuities (see Brown et al. (2001) for a review).”
- The Simple Analytics of a Pooled Annuity Fund (2005, unknown): “TIAA-CREF reports that historically, the impact of annual mortality adjustments has been relatively modest.1 Brown et al. (2001) provide additional commentary on the TIAA-CREF product.”
- What Determines Annuity Demand at Retirement? (2012, unknown): “57 See Mitchell et al. (1999) and Brown et al. (2001) for the U.S., Cannon and Tonks (2004, 2008) and Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) for the U.K., Guazzarotti and Tommasino (2008) for Italy.”
- The Impact of Health Status and Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures on Annuity Valuation (2004, methodology): “All calculations assume premium costs calculated based on the Annuitant Mortality Life Table (SOA 1999); no loads as per Mitchell et al. (1999).”
- Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (2004, unknown): “Features that our hazard models indicate are selected by low mortality individuals, the "high risk" annuity buyers from the perspective of the insurance company, are priced higher than features that are selected by high-mortality individuals.”