Insider Trading, Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence Based on Hong Kong Firms

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Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Meta‐Analysis (2009, background): “…CEO compensation (Balsam, 1998; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006), composite measures of accruals or corporate governance variables (Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 2006; Larcker et al., 2007; Leuz et al., 2003); results not transformable into r (Jaggi & Tsui, 2007; Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2000, 2005).”
Corporate Governance, Islamic Governance and Earnings Management in Oman: A New Empirical Insights from a Behavioural Theoretical Framework (2017, unknown): “This is important because concentrated ownership structures can render the markets for corporate control, capital, services, executive talent and labour meant to discipline underperforming managers and corporations ineffective (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jaggi and Tsui, 2007; Alves, 2012; Chen and Z”
Ownership Structure and Earnings Management: Evidence from Portugal (2012, background): “Therefore, large shareholders may intervene in the firm’s management, and may encourage managers to engage in earnings management to maximise their private benefits (Jaggi & Tsui 2007).”