Corruption and Competition in Procurement Auctions

By Olivier Compte, A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, Thierry Verdier. 2005

171 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works (2009, background): “Compte et al (2005) and LambertMogiliansky and Sonin (2006) show independently that collusion may emerge in equilibrium in auctions conducted by a corrupt auctioneer.”
Tenure in Office and Public Procurement (2010, unknown): “Like in Compte et al. (2005), the investigations showed some firms were allowed by the bureaucrats to open the envelops, screen the other bids, and make a winning adjustment to their own bid.”
Auction Procedures and Competition in Public Services: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France and London (2009, background): “…other words, the inefficiency cost of corruption increases with the auctioneer’s discretionary power, whether corruption translates into favouritism as in Burguet and Che (2004) or whether it results in making collusion sustainable as in Lambert-Mogiliansky and Sonin (2006) or Compte et al. (2005).”