Cursed by Resources or Institutions
By Halvor Mehlum, K. Moene, Ragnar Torvik. 2006
509 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Information Systems
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2345778e8db9188693143679878970fb06d6e540
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Development
In Economics and Econometrics
- E. Papyrakis
- E. Gilberthorpe
- G. Hilson
- V. Daniele
- F. van der ploeg
- Andreas Kotsadam
- Ting Chen
- R. Maconachie
In Information Systems
- Ans Kolk
- Andreas Kotsadam
- V. Daniele
- S. Monni
- James Kai Sing Kung
- E. Papyrakis
- Marcus J. Kurtz
- V. Costantini
Citations in the corpus
- Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of Investment (2006, unknown): “, oil and minerals) and are easy to grab (Isham et al., 2006; Mehlum et al., 2006).”
- Natural Resources and the ‘Quality’ of Economic Development (2011, background): “Natural resources tend, in fact, to be significantly correlated to human welfare in countries with a comparatively lower institutional quality, as suggested by recent studies (Mehlum et al. 2006), but they do not play a significant role in countries with comparatively better institutions, where othe”
- Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? (2011, background): “But subsequent evidence offers support for the hypothesis that with good institutions the curse can be turned into a blessing (Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006a, 2006b).”
- MNC Reporting on CSR and Conflict in Central Africa (2010, background): “…to the link between abundance of natural resources on the one hand, and higher chances of violent conflict and relatively poor performance on other social, economic and political indicators in developing countries on the other hand (cf. Mehlum et al., 2006; Sachs and Warner, 2001; UNCTAD, 2007).”
- “GOOD GOVERNANCE” AND THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (2008, background): “’’ It is maintained here that the body of work amassed by Davis and others who share similar views (e.g., Luong and Weinthal 2006; Mehlum et al. 2006) has helped to galvanize the institutional strand of the resourcecurse debate, the notion that resource rents accrued from a minerals or oil boom tend”
- Environment, Human Development and Economic Growth (2008, background): “…looks deeply at the relationships between the quality of institutions and the capacity to manage resources exploitation with theoretical (Mehlum et al., 2002; 2005) and empirical studies (Bulte et al., 2005; Isham et al., 2003; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian,…”
- Dutch Disease or Agglomeration? The Local Economic Effects of Natural Resource Booms in Modern America (2018, unknown): “[54] Mehlum, Halvor, Karl Moene, and Ragnar Torvik (2006).”
- Conditioning the “Resource Curse”: Globalization, Human Capital, and Growth in Oil-Rich Nations (2011, background): “Empirical research points to the divergent growth equilibria observable among resource-rich nations, which include not only the “growth losers” such as Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone, and Angola but also a set of resource-abundant “growth winners” such as Botswana, Canada, Australia, and Norway (Mehl”
- Definitions and dimensions of energy security: a literature review (2018, background): “Otherwise, if there is no questioning to those in power, the resources are highly probable to be a curse.(132,133) In other cases, other nations or governments decide to control the access to an energy resource by overthrowing current controllers or owners, starting a war against energy rich countri”
- Resource Curse: New Evidence on the Role of Institutions (2014, background): “As Leite and Weidmann (1999) stated, good institutional arrangement is also crucial to the management of optimal and efficient resources.1 Mehlum et al. (2006) explain that the high-quality institution is one that is producer friendly and not grabber friendly.”