SMM rootkits: a new breed of OS independent malware
By S. Embleton, S. Sparks, Cliff Changchun Zou. 2008
154 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Victor Costan
- Rohit Sinha
- Sanjit A. Seshia
- Pramod Subramanyan
- Saad Khan
- Srini Devadas
- Yongrui Qin
- S. Parkinson
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Victor Costan
- Saad Khan
- Rohit Sinha
- Srini Devadas
- Yongrui Qin
- Sanjit A. Seshia
- S. Parkinson
- Walter J. Scheirer
In Signal Processing
- Victor Costan
- Rohit Sinha
- Sanjit A. Seshia
- Srini Devadas
- Yongrui Qin
- Walter J. Scheirer
- Ilia A. Lebedev
- Jacob Dumford
Citations in the corpus
- Backdooring Convolutional Neural Networks via Targeted Weight Perturbations (2018, background): “[24], there are several types of modern rootkit attacks that are still dangerous to systems [5, 17].”
- A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves (2017, background): “, OS, hypervisor, firmware) in its trusted computing base (TCB), where numerous exploits have allowed privileged malware to execute [24, 32, 36, 48, 57].”
- Intel SGX Explained (2016, background): “However, the SMM handler was compromised on multiple occasions [44, 49, 164, 186, 189], and an attacker who obtains SMM execution can access the”
- Fog computing security: a review of current applications and security solutions (2017, background): “Those designing and developing Fog systems would need to consider the potential of underlying operating system [131] to become compromised and considering how their system, and its physical implications can be protected to minimise damage.”
- Sanctum: Minimal Hardware Extensions for Strong Software Isolation (2016, background): “This is a concern, as the myriad of security vulnerabilities [16, 18, 39, 50–54] in TXT [22], Intel’s previous attempt at securing remote computation, show that securing the machinery underlying Intel’s processors is incredibly challenging, even in the presence of strong economic incentives.”