Knightian decision theory. Part I

By Truman F. Bewley. 2002

723 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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In General Decision Sciences

Citations in the corpus

Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude (2004, background): “2 The Perception of Ambiguity We now show that the unambiguous preference relation <∗ can be represented by a set of probabilities, thus extending to an arbitrary state space a result of Bewley [2].”
Reference-dependent utility with shifting reference points and incomplete preferences (2007, neutral): “There has recently been a revived interest in incomplete preference relations (Dubra, Maccheroni, & Ok, 2004; Eliaz & Ok, 2006; Girotto & Holzer, 2005; Maccheroni, 2004; Mandler, 2005; Masatlioglu & Ok, 2005; Ok, 2002, earlier contributions are Aumann, 1962; Bewley, 1986; Vind, 1991).”
Ranking Sets of Objects (2001, neutral): “See, for example, Bewley [23], Gilboa and Schmeidler [65], and Schmeidler [136].”
Revealed Ambiguity and Its Consequences: Updating (2008, background): “That is, unambiguous preference is a partial ordering, which is represented à la Bewley (2002) by the set of priors C (see Eq.”
Theory Of Decision Under Uncertainty (2009, background): “It differs from Bewley’s (2002) in several ways.”
Smooth Ambiguity Aversion toward Small Risks and Continuous-Time Recursive Utility (2013, background): “Another early proposed representation of ambiguity aversion, due to Bewley ð1986Þ, is also nonsmooth.”
Model Uncertainty, Limited Market Participation and Asset Prices (2005, background): “8For alternative specifications of Knightian uncertainty, see Schmeidler (1989) and Bewley (1986).”
THE AMBIGUITY AVERSION LITERATURE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2009, methodology): “We do not comment on other approaches such as the incomplete preference approach of Bewley ((1986), (2002)), minimax regret of Savage (1951), or models inspired by classical statistics.”
A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs (2014, background): “In Bewley (2002), an individual decision maker holds several belief distributions and overcomes inertia only if the new choice dominates the status quo under all belief distributions.”
The effects of uncertainty on market liquidity: Evidence from Hurricane Sandy (2019, positive): “This rank-ordering can lead to ties and Easley and O’Hara (2010) supplement the theory with the “inertia” assumption introduced in Bewley (2002).”
IS IT ALWAYS RATIONAL TO SATISFY SAVAGE'S AXIOMS? (2009, background): “Indeed, this is the way that it is viewed by many in diverse fields such as statistics, philosophy, 1 See Knight (1921), Ellsberg (1961), as well as Shafer (1986) and Schmeidler (1989). and computer science.2 However, within economic theory the Bayesian approach is the sole claimant to the throne of”
Subjective Expected Utility With Incomplete Preferences (2013, background): “Moreover, if Φ′ = {(π′, V ) | V ∈ V, π′ ∈ Π } represents in the sense of (3), then 〈Φ̂′〉 = 〈Φ̂〉 and π (s) > 0 for all s.”
Asymmetric Responses to Earnings News: A Case for Ambiguity (2015, positive): “The literature suggests a connection between ambiguity and both trading volume and bid-ask spreads (Bewley, 2002; Dow and Werlang, 1992; Epstein and Schneider, 2007 and Easley and O'Hara, 2008, Easley and O'Hara, 2009).”
A theory of case-based decisions (2001, background): “of uncertainty (and in the absence of a subjective prior) one may still use those generalizations of EUT that were developed to deal with this problem specifically, such as non-additive probabilities (Schmeidler (1989)9) and multiple priors (Bewley (1986)10, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)).”
Liquidity and Valuation in an Uncertain World (2010, methodology): “6 Bewley’s work was originally distributed as Cowles Foundation Working paper no. 807 in 1986. Aumann [1962] provided an earlier representation theorem for incomplete preferences, but his approach is not tailored to the question posed by Knight.”