Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude

By Paolo Ghirardato, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci. Journal of Economics Theory, 2004

1,069 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c8f4219857105405d393ff65aef3f56df8a25725

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Citations in the corpus

Estimating Ambiguity Aversion in a Portfolio Choice Experiment (2009, background): “[Figure 1 here] 1See, MEU: Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989); CEU: Schmeidler (1989); -MEU: Ghirardato et al. (2004) and Olszewski (2006); Contraction Expected Utility: Gajdos et al. (2008); REU: Ergin and Gul (2004), Klibanoff et al. (2005), Nau (2005), Seo (2009), and related work by Halevy and…”
ANTICIPATING REGRET : WHY FEWER OPTIONS MAY BE BETTER (2008, background): “See, for example, Corollary B.3 of Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004).”
Portfolio Selection with Parameter and Model Uncertainty: A Multi-Prior Approach (2004, neutral): “10See Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) for models where ambiguity aversion is potentially separable from ambiguity; but, these models require the decision maker to specify subjective probabilities over the priors.”
Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: Neo-additive capacities (2007, positive): “[10] present a model which generalizes Gilboa and Schmeidler [15] and which also allows for positive and negative attitudes toward ambiguity.”
Scientific Ambiguity and Climate Policy (2013, background): “…utility obtained under that model as a function of a as EUm(a) = ∫ U (a(S))πm(S)d S.7 Then the policy maker’s objective function can be written as 6 Ghirardato et al. (2004) achieve a similar separation between tastes and beliefs, but their framework is not well suited to the comparative…”
Neural signatures of economic preferences for risk and ambiguity. (2006, methodology): “Using the choice history of each subject, we estimated subjects’ preferences for ambiguity and risk, represented by the parameters a (Ghirardato et al., 2004) and b respectively (see Experimental Procedures).”
A simplified axiomatic approach to ambiguity aversion (2010, result): “While this is consistent with Strzalecki (2009), it runs contrary to preference-based attempts to define “ambiguous,” such as in Epstein and Zhang (2001), Ghirardato et al. (2004) , and Ahn (2008).”
Trusting the stock market (2008, background): “…is of the form: v(x) = a(x) min π∈Π Eπu(x) + (1 − a(x)) max π∈Π Eπu(x) where Eπu(x) is the expected utility of x under the probability distribution π. a(x) is what Ghirardato et al. (2004) call the index of ambiguity aversion, which they allow possibly to depend on the choice variable x.”
Rational preferences under ambiguity (2011, background): “We first argue that, for such preferences, a set of priors can be obtained following the approach of Ghirardato et al. (2004, GMM henceforth); i.e., as a representation of the derived unambiguous preference relation.2 Thus, in a specific behavioral sense, one can identify probabilities that are sign”