Arrow’s theorem as a corollary

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The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory (2012, background): “Nehring and Puppe (2010) drop the condition called truth-functionality which corresponds here to the closure of X for propositional variables.”
Judgment aggregation: A survey (2009, background): “More generally, Nehring (2005) characterized truth-functional relations between multiple premises and one conclusion in terms of the admitted aggregation rules satisfying independence and monotonicity on the premises and respecting unanimous judgments on the conclusion; for su¢ ciently complex truth”
Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation (2007, methodology): “…who derived a simple impossibility theorem on preference aggregation from their (2002) impossibility result on judgment aggregation, and Nehring (2003), who derived an Arrow-like impossibility theorem from Nehring and Puppeís (2002) characterization result in the related model of…”