Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation

By Franz Dietrich, Christian List. Social Choice and Welfare, 2007

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Handbook of Computational Social Choice (2016, background): “Also the idea of deriving Arrow’s Theorem from results in JA, as brieﬂy mentioned at the end of the Section 17.4.2, is due to Dietrich and List (2007c).”
The doctrinal paradox, the discursive dilemma, and logical aggregation theory (2012, methodology): “11Quota rules are de ned as in Dietrich and List (2007a), who, after Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2008), study them in detail; see also Dietrich (2010). as an impossibility theorem about collective judgment.”
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling (2016, unknown): “…values ëtrueí/ëfalseí or ëyesí/ënoí to a set of propositions, based on the individualsí assignments ñ a problem now known as judgment aggregation (e.g., List and Pettit 2002; Dietrich 2007; Dietrich and List 2007; Nehring and Puppe 2010; Dokow and Holzman 2010; for a recent review, see List 2012).”
Judgment aggregation: A survey (2009, methodology): “A de…nition of strategy-proofness of F , as opposed to strategy-proofness of F, is given in Dietrich and List (2007c), extending List (2004).”