Rebate versus matching: does how we subsidize charitable contributions matter?

By Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman. 2003

396 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2202295e8a4c359920aebbcf68055d36107c06e5

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. John A. List
2. Dean S. Karlan
3. Eldar Shafir
4. René Bekkers
5. C. Null
6. Pamala Wiepking
7. J. Ruiz-Navarro
8. C. Camelo‐Ordaz

In Safety Research

1. Pamala Wiepking
2. Dean S. Karlan
3. René Bekkers
4. C. Null
5. John A. List
6. A. Wit
7. Eldar Shafir
8. Imran Rasul

Citations in the corpus

• Do Subsidies Increase Charitable Giving in the Long Run? Matching Donations in a Field Experiment (2007, neutral): “There has been little research on matching charitable giving.2 Eckel and Grossman (2003) present the first laboratory experiment which systematically analyzes matching donations (for a replication and comments, see Davis, Millner, and Reilly 2005).”
• Small matches and charitable giving: Evidence from a natural field experiment (2011, background): “For example, what we learn from the lab experiments of Eckel and Grossman (2003) is that matches work much better than rebates.”
• The Influence of Gender on Entrepreneurial Intention: The Mediating Role of Perceptual Factors (2016, background): “Simlarly, Eckel and Grossman (2003) and Siegrist et al. (2002) emonstrated that both men and women often consider men ore risk tolerant than women, and that women tend to elieve that men have a lower fear of failure than men onsider themselves to have.”
• Giving to Secular Causes by the Religious and Nonreligious: An Experimental Test of the Responsiveness of Giving to Subsidies (2004, neutral): “The Epps-Singleton test is a nonparametric test designed to distinguish between different distributions (see Epps & Singleton, 1986) and is especially useful for discrete data such as ours.”
• Warm glow, information, and inefficient charitable giving (2011, background): “Eckel and Grossman (2003) nd that subjects in dictator games are more generous to charities when contributions are matched rather than subsidized, with important implications for income tax policy.”
• Government Support and Charitable Donations: A Meta-Analysis of the Crowding-out Hypothesis (2016, background): “Governments can enhance donations by matches or rebates (Eckel and Grossman 2003), but our analysis is restricted to unconditional government grants.”