Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution

By Samuel Bowles. 2003

1,027 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2149d1f44b534a62f7f11ac6166ed485e1a9d8a7

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Citations in the corpus

What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field (2009, unknown): “Following Levine (1998) and Bowles (2003), ˇi can be specified to capture both altruism and reciprocity preferences in the following way:”
Parental background and other-regarding preferences in children (2014, background): “A positive spectrum of other-regarding preferences—altruism, inequality aversion, and efficiency concerns—helps to establish and maintain cooperative and fair group outcomes even in situations with a limited scope for reputation-building (Bowles 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003), while spitefulness l”
Culture and social behavior (2015, background): “Neither psychology nor economics is currently theoretically well-equipped to explain the origins of institutions [53].”
On Economic Growth, Marketing Systems, and the Quality of Life (2009, background): “, Nelson and Winter 1982; Potts 2000; Metcalfe and Foster 2004) that leads to the applications of complexity science to economic systems, in evolutionary game theory modeling (Bowles 2004; Skyrms 2004) and the New Institutional Economics (Ménard and Shirley 2005). The modeling of emergent processes ”
Aspirations: An Approach to Measurement with Validation Using Ethiopian Data (2014, background): “Preferences are the attributes of individuals, other than beliefs and capacities, that constitute the reasons for behaviour, that is, account for the actions they take in a given situation (Bowles, 2004).”
Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study (2012, unknown): “This result is consistent with group selection models of cooperation and punishment (see, for example, Boyd et al., 2003, and Chapter 13 in Bowles, 2003).”
Review and classification of barriers and enablers of demand response in the smart grid (2017, background): “2 Behavioural barriers Behavioural barriers may be described as those factors which explain why the behaviour of any individual deviates from that of the ideal, fully rational (in the classical economic sense) agent [40].”
Human prosociality from an evolutionary perspective: variation and correlations at a city-wide scale ☆ (2009, background): “Game theorists refer to a “replicator dynamic” as any process whereby the most successful behavioral strategy increases in frequency through time, which can include such things as learning and imitation in addition to genetic evolution (Bowles, 2003; Gintis, 2000).”
Social Capital and Community Governance (2002, unknown): “We have explained elsewhere why we find these explanations inadequate (Bowles and Gintis, 2001; Gintis, 2000a; Bowles, 2003).”