Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all

By Cosmides Leda, J. Tooby. 1996

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Citations in the corpus

Rapid Trust Calibration through Interpretable and Uncertainty-Aware AI (2020, background): “Research since has suggested that some such errors can bemitigated by presenting probabilities in a form closer to humans’ natural mental representations of them as frequencies of events.(78) Combined with the observation that people naturally describe aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties different”
Different ways in which students handle chance encounters in the explorative setting of a dice game (2007, unknown): “Such differences in task construction may have an important impact on the learning outcomes (Cosmides and Tooby 1996).”
The use of Bayes and causal modelling in decision making, uncertainty and risk (2011, background): “In many cases, lay people only accept Bayes theorem as being 'correct' and are able to reason correctly, when the information is presented in alternative graphical ways, such as using event trees and frequencies (see [3] and [6] for a comprehensive investigation of these issues).”
When more is Less: The Impact of Base Value Neglect on Consumer Preferences for Bonus Packs over Price Discounts (2012, unknown): “Perhaps because people are evolutionarily wired to function in “frequentist” (i.e., whole number based) rather than “probabalist” (i.e., percentages, decimals, fractions) terms (Cosmides and Tooby 1996), they tend to have difficulties with percentages.”
Heuristics and Biases: Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate? (2002, unknown): “…ecologist” camp (to use Piattelli-Palmarini’s 1994, p. 183 term) with its emphasis on the ability of evolutionary mechanisms to achieve an optimal Brunswikian tuning of the organism to the local environment (Brase et al. 1998; Cosmides & Tooby 1994; 1996; Oaksford & Chater 1994; 1998; Pinker 1997).”
Evolutionary versus instrumental goals: How evolutionary psychology misconceives human rationality (2003, background): “…championed by various evolutionary psychologists, adaptationist modelers, and ecological theorists (Anderson, 1990, 1991; Chater & Oaksford, 2000; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; 1994b, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1996a; Oaksford & Chater, 1998, 2001; Rode, Cosmides, Hell, & Tooby, 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000).”
Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists? (2001, background): “Assuming the existence of domain-specific reasoning modules, Cosmides and Tooby (1996) even argue that the starkness of laboratory environments prevents specialized inference engines from being activated, and that mismatches between cues and problem types are far more likely under artificial…”
Objectivity in the eye of the beholder: divergent perceptions of bias in self versus others. (2004, unknown): “…30 years are not worthy of the attention they have received—that such " biases " are the product of methodological artifact, tricky experimenters, or assessments of human capacities removed from appropriate ecological niches (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer, 1996; Krueger & Funder, in press).”
Bailing and jailing the fast and frugal way (2001, unknown): “It is claimed that this is a natural form of processing (Cosmides and Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995).”