Providing robust and ubiquitous security support for mobile ad-hoc networks

By Jiejun Kong, Petros Zerfos, Haiyun Luo, Songwu Lu, Lixia Zhang. Proceedings Ninth International Conference on Network Protocols. ICNP 2001, 2001

852 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1eb5523a9ab228614f276ed19411915d2a4b073d

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In Computer Networks and Communications

Citations in the corpus

Denial of Service in Sensor Networks (2002, background): “This vulnerability could give an adversary the unrestricted ability to construct valid routing messages, although threshold cryptography with share updating can protect against this possibility.(12) Monitoring”
Observation-based Cooperation Enforcement in Ad Hoc Networks (2003, background): “Schemes to handle authentication in ad hoc networks assuming trusted Certiﬁcate Authorities have been proposed by Zhou and Haas [29], and Kong et al. [19].”
Secure routing for mobile ad hoc networks (2005, background): “The extended Resurrecting Duckling security model proposed the imprinting of devices with policies that define the type of relationships the slave device is allowed by its master to have with others in order to address peer-to-peer interactions [49].”
A secure routing protocol for ad hoc networks (2002, background): “Kong, et al. [10] have proposed a secure ad hoc routing protocol based on secret sharing; un-fortunately, this protocol is based on erroneous assumptions, e.g., that each node cannot impersonate the MAC address of multiple other nodes.”
Security in mobile ad hoc networks: challenges and solutions (2004, methodology): “It is based on the URSA certification framework [20].”
Wormhole attacks in wireless networks (2006, background): “Zhou and Haas [42] propose such a public-key infrastructure; Hubaux et al. bootstrap trust relationships from PGP-like certificates without relying on a trusted public-key infrastructure [15]; Kong et al. [22] propose asymmetric mechanisms for threshold signatures for certificates.”
MOCA : MObile Certificate Authority for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks (2004, methodology): “While this imposes significant overhead on the network, we would expect a revocation to be a rather infrequent event and the cost would be amortized over time.”
Secure aggregation for wireless networks (2003, background): “An adversary may be able to position several intruder nodes within the network and use them to transmit false messages.”
Packet leashes: a defense against wormhole attacks in wireless networks (2003, background): “et al [23] propose asymmetric mechanisms for threshold signatures for certificates.”
Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols (2003, methodology): “We assume that the keys necessary for broadcast authenticat ion are distributed in advance; a number of techniques for distribu ing such information have been proposed [2, 17, 18, 25, 43, 47].”
Random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks (2003, background): “propose localized public-key infrastructure mechanisms, based on secret sharing and multiparty computation techniques [14].”
INSENS: Intrusion-Tolerant Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks (2002, background): “In the field of ad hoc wireless networking [Broch98, Royer99], previous work on secure routing employs public key cryptography to perform authentication ([ Kong01 , NAI, Papadimitratos02b, Zhou99, Zhang98]).”
Self-Organized Public-Key Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (2003, background): “A more recent proposal [7] describes a similar approach, but it provides a more fair distribution of the burden by allowing any node to carry a share of the private key of the service.”
Statistical en-route filtering of injected false data in sensor networks (2004, background): “…authentication mechanism to sensor networks and revoke the key of any compromised node, in reality the computation and storage constraints of small sensor nodes make mechanisms based on asymmetric cryptography, such as the one described in [4], infeasible. false report sink compromised node Fig.”
Mobility helps security in ad hoc networks (2003, background): “[17] describes a similar approach, but it provides a more fair distribution of the burden by allowing any node to carry a share of the private key of the service.”
TinyPK: securing sensor networks with public key technology (2004, background): “al [13] define an RSA-based security architecture for ad hoc networks.”