Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols

By Yih-Chun Hu, Adrian Perrig, David B. Johnson. WISE, 2003

833 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/020fc79eea65dc81e36dd3844841b4369439c58b

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In Computer Networks and Communications

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Citations in the corpus

Information theoretic framework of trust modeling and evaluation for ad hoc networks (2006, background): “Due to their distributed nature, ad hoc networks are vulnerable to various attacks [1]–[5].”
A survey of secure wireless ad hoc routing (2004, methodology): “We proposed an approach where blacklist or other revocation information can be flooded through the network when it is discovered.(2) With this approach, some flood limiting is necessary, or an attacker can get its certificate revoked and repeatedly flood the network with this revocation information.”
Securing wireless sensor networks: a survey (2008, methodology): “Attackers can inject false routing information to launch a Sybil attack [103, 104] or redirect packets to change network topology [105, 106].”
Security of the Internet of Things: Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures (2019, background): “[77] provided RAP (Rushing Attack Prevention), a new protocol that thwarts the rushing attack.”
A survey of security issues in mobile ad hoc and sensor networks (2005, background): “Since the sender using higher powers cannot receive the packet from further nodes, it will not be able to perform the neighbor detection process, and it will be ignored [21].”
Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks (2007, background): “Several groups of researchers have studied the problem of securing ad hoc network routing protocols, including Papadimitratos and Haas [300, 302, 303, 304, 305]; Hu, Perrig, and Johnson [178, 182, 183]; Zapata and Asokan [391]; and Sanzgiri, Dahill, Levine, Shields, and Belding-Royer [338].”
MOCA : MObile Certificate Authority for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks (2004, background): “• Routing Layer Attacks - Malicious nodes can disrupt routing behavior by advertising false routing information, injecting incorrect routing packets, or even luring all packets and dropping them [2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 27].”
Denial of service resilience in ad hoc networks (2004, methodology): “Examples of protocols that achieve the above objectives are discussed in Section 5, but for concreteness, we can consider a secure source routing protocol as in reference [17] as well as enhancements such as [19, 20].”
Modeling mobility for vehicular ad-hoc networks (2004, neutral): “As shown in Table 1, this is in keeping with the transmission range (cid:151) simulation area (cid:151) total nodes combinations that are among the ones normally used [6, 11].”
Security in mobile ad hoc networks: challenges and solutions (2004, background): “…signals can't be injected into the network, routing messages don't change during transporting except protocol routines, routing loops don't create during aggressive activities, the shortest routes don't change by hostile nodes and so on are considered, it can be called a secure protocol [17] .”
Visualization of wormholes in sensor networks (2004, background): “This forms the “rushing attack” studied by Hu et al [14].”
A Survey of Attacks and Countermeasures in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (2007, background): “a dedicated channel shared by attackers) exists between the two ends of the wormhole, the tunneled packets can propagate faster than those through a normal multi-hop route. This forms the rushing attack [ 19 ].”
Secure routing for internet of things: A survey (2016, background): “A comprehensive study on these attacks have been covered by [45, 51-59].”
Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks (2002, background): “Rushing attacks can be probabilistically prevented by slightly modifying the Route Discovery protocol [22].”