Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference, and Consciousness
By Marilyn Ford, Philip N. Johnson-Laird. 1985
Subfields: Cognitive Science & Psychology
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Science & Psychology
- Peter W. Battaglia
- Uri Hasson
- Josh Tenenbaum
- Jessica B. Hamrick
- Géry d'Ydewalle
- B. D. de Koning
- Holly A. Taylor
- Anind K. Dey
Citations in the corpus
- Metrics for Explainable AI: Challenges and Prospects (2018, background): “, procedural rules), These are researchers’ computational models of what a user’s mental model might be (see for instance, Clancey, 1986; Johnson-Laird, 1983; de Kleer, Doyle, Steele, and Sussman, 1977; Doyle, et al., 2002; Moray, 1983; Schaffernicht and Groesser, 2011).”
- Manipulating and Measuring Model Interpretability (2018, background): “Within the human–computer interaction community, there is a longstanding practice of taking a user-centered perspective and acknowledging that people are active participants who form their own mental models of how computational systems work [32, 47, 82].”
- When Teams Agree While Disagreeing: Reflexion and Reflection in Shared Cognition (2015, background): “15 constructing mental models requires logical reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1983), sharedness of C-”
- Mental Models, Visual Reasoning and Interaction in Information Visualization: A Top-down Perspective (2010, background): “Johnson-Laird’s theory of mental models is more elaborate [19].”
- Cognition and Hierarchy: Rethinking the Microfoundations of Capabilities' Development (2005, background): “Thinking is thus often premised on cognitive representations of reality (Simon 1955), which simplify the decision problem in the mind of the agent (Johnson-Laird 1983, Weick 1990) and help her cope with her limited processing capacity (Halford et al. 1993) Therefore, I assume that representations…”
- Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality (2012, background): “…suggest that, despite the variety of moral transgressions, there is a cognitive template of morality—the moral dyad—which not only integrates across various moral transgressions but also serves as a working model for understanding the moral world (Baldwin, 1992; Craik, 1967; Johnson-Laird, 1986).”