The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation

By Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. S. Lee, Gerald S. Martin. 2008

770 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1e834ceb56f7766902b01803cb045e098adf41a7

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Citations in the corpus

Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a, 2008b) document that 1,433 of 2,206 culpable employees in fraud cases were VPs, of which only a third (515) were CEOs.”
Shareholder Litigation, Reputational Loss, and Bank Loan Contracting (2014, neutral): “Karpoff et al. (2014) find that the filing date on the SCAC database postdates the time at which investors first learn of the purported misconduct that triggers the litigation (the “allegation date”) by an average of 150 calendar days, compared to 113 calendar days in our sample.”
Implications of Power: When the CEO Can Pressure the CFO to Bias Reports (2014, neutral): “Biasing costs, q, and the externalities that the biasing imposes on the CEO and the firm, parameterized by v and k, also depend on the probability of bias being detected and the expected losses conditional on detection, including adverse effects on wealth and employment as well as criminal prosecuti”
Monitoring and Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2013, neutral): “Greater information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders could matter if the firm is funded primarily with information-sensitive securities, as in Myers and Majluf (1984). Greater disparity of information among investors could lead to a loss of liquidity (Diamond, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1”
Political connections, SEC enforcement and accounting quality (2009, neutral): “One notable exception is Kedia and Rajgopal (2011), who find that, because the SEC is resource constrained, it is more likely to investigate firms located close to its offices and with higher visibility.”
Detecting and Predicting Accounting Irregularities: A Comparison of Commercial and Academic Risk Measures (2011, background): “As discussed in Karpoff et al. (2008a), AAERs are not limited to financial misrepresentations and they do not cover all such actions; therefore, our sample of all accounting-related enforcement actions is more comprehensive than a sample of AAERs.”
Corporate Fraud and the Value of Reputations in the Product Market (2014, neutral): “The consequences of a damaged reputation that results from corporate misconduct have been investigated extensively in previous studies (Alexander, 1999; Gande and Lewis, 2009; Karpoff and Lott, 1993; Karpoff et al., 2008a, 2008b).”
Investor Perceptions of Financial Misconduct: The Heterogeneous Contamination of Bystander Firms (2015, background): “For example, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008) found that, in the 788 investigations carried out by the SEC and United States Department of Justice from 1978 to 2006, more than 3,000 individuals (two-thirds of whom were firm employees, one-third of whom were top executives of the firms) were charged…”