Manipulation and Equity-Based Compensation

By Lin Peng, A. Röell. 2008

119 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1def546e0e5abaaa8f9947acae5f5b630970bea0

Citations in the corpus

• Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation (2013, unknown): “V0 ( 25 ) In the executive’s preferences, money and leisure are complementary.”
• CFOs versus CEOs: Equity Incentives and Crashes (2011, unknown): “Peng and Roell (2008) analytically show that options have a more powerful impact than stock awards on managers’ incentives to engage in share price manipulation, given their higher payperformance elasticity.”
• Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016, unknown): “In a similar vein, Peng and Roell (2008, 2014) and Goldman and Slezak (2006) demonstrate that high-powered incentives that vest in the short term can encourage the manager to expend firm resources to manipulate the stock price upwards.”