Political foundations of the resource curse

By James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, Thierry Verdier. 2006

1,705 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Building and Construction, Development, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1d541b350bad2bbefc32e84b36017a7683dd8305

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Citations in the corpus

Optimal Dutch disease (2005, background): “…rent-seeking (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Baland and Francois, 2000; Torvik, 2002; Mehlum et al., 2002) and political economy theories of why resource abundance invites bad policy choices (Ross, 1999, 2001; Robinson et al., 2002; Damania and Bulte, 2003). tion of traded goods.”
Resource curse: An analysis of causes, experiences and possible ways forward (2007, background): “A range of cross-country statistical work has confirmed this proposition (Atkinson and Hamilton, 2003; Dietz et al., 2006; Gylfason, 2001; Korhonen, 2004; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Mehlum et al., 2002; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Robinson et al., 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).”
Dealing with Dutch Disease (2010, background): “Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) develop a model, in countries with weak institutional controls on the use of clientelism and patronage to influence elections, where a natural resource boom creates incentives for politicians to use revenues on expanded public sector spending and employment to…”
Public capital in resource rich economies: is there a curse? (2014, background): “Others have argued whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing depends on country-specific circumstances especially institutional quality (eg., Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Collier and Goderis, 2007; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010a,b).”
How economic growth, renewable electricity and natural resources contribute to CO2 emissions? (2018, background): “curse blame low institutional quality for a lack of incentives (Robinson et al., 2006).”
Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing? (2011, background): “…riches raise the value of being in power and induce politicians to expand public sectors, bribe voters by offering them well paid but unproductive jobs and inefficient subsidies and tax handouts, especially if accountability and state competence are lacking (Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006).”
The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources (2011, neutral): “For countries with bad institutions, there are two reasons to expect a negative relationship between human capital and natural resources: (i) The amount of natural resources and human capital is a decreasing function of natural resources when the incumbent is in power.”
The Politics of the Resource Curse: A Review (2020, positive): “…consistent with the rentier effect (e.g., Crystal, 1990; Yates, 1996; Fish, 2005; Kendall-Taylor, 2012). native set of approaches explored formally by Robinson et al. (2006), Morrison (2007), and Caselli and Cunningham (2009), and informally by Fish (2005) suggests that resources affect the value…”
Promoting transparency and accountability through ICTs, social media, and collaborative e‐government (2012, background): “This is particularly true in developing, resource rich countries, where the political elite often has control of resources and resource rents, as well as control over patronage and the distribution of resources – a situation known as the “resource curse” (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Kolstad et al., 2009”
Corruption in natural resource management: Implications for policy makers (2009, background): “Increasingly, the resource curse has been identified as a problem of natural resources leading to dysfunctional behaviour in a poor institutional context (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; Bulte et al., 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Collier and Goderis, 2007).”
Natural Resources and Economic Development: New Panel Evidence (2015, background): “While not without its critics,2 there is also evidence of an economic curse (blessing) conditional on having poor (good) institutions (Mehlum et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2006; Boschini et al. 2007, 2013; Collier and Goderis 2007; Olsson 2007; Bulte and Damania 2008; Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010, 2”