Do Analysts Generate Trade for Their Firms? Evidence from the Toronto Stock Exchange

By Paul Irvine. 2000

187 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1c98dd579b2c416b459a6f7fe515dd1176abf768

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Citations in the corpus

Analysts' Forecasts and Brokerage-Firm Trading (2003, background): “Irvine (2000) argues that because of the similarities between the sell-side analyst environments in Canada and the U.S., conclusions based on Canadian data are likely to apply to the U.S. market.”
Evidence on the Information Content of Text in Analyst Reports (2014, background): “Second, prior research shows that analysts are optimistically biased because of incentives to generate underwriting business (Lin and McNichols 1998), increase trading commissions (Irvine 2001), and retain access to management (Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan 1998).”
Monitors or Predators: The Influence of Institutional Investors on Sell-side Analysts (2013, unknown): “contrast, Irvine (2004) finds that in the Canadian market only optimistic forecasts relative to”
Trade Generation, Reputation and Sell-Side Analysts (2005, methodology): “12 Previous research uses the number of analysts employed by the brokerage firm as a proxy for broker size (eg Irvine (2001), Hong & Kubik (2003)).”
The Informational Role of Bond Analysts (2009, unknown): “For example, Irvine (2001, 2004) shows that a broker's trading volume is significantly higher in stocks covered by the equity analysts it employs, and is specifically higher in the weeks following analysts' forecasts and recommendations.”
Broker-Hosted Investor Conferences (2014, methodology): “…period t. Scaling by total Ancerno commissions removes variation in total dollar commissions in stock k at time t as a potential source of bias (Irvine, 2001).14 In particular, total commissions are driven by factors outside of the broker’s control (e.g., press releases, security filings,…”
Analysts’ Forecasts and Asset Pricing: A Survey (2016, unknown): “The study interprets this finding as evidence that when earnings are less predictable, analysts 3 Related, Hayes (1998) and Irvine (2000) demonstrate that analysts’ desire to generate…”
On the Information Role of Stock Recommendation Revisions (2009, background): “Analogously, measures of abnormal trading around revisions are likely to be confounded with abnormal trading triggered by events and news (Irvine, 2000; Jackson, 2005; Juergens and Lindsey, 2006).”
Determinants of the Informativeness of Analyst Research (2006, unknown): “Our measure of informativeness is related to the variance measure of informativeness of earnings reports pioneered by Beaver (1968) and used in subsequent research (see Landsman and Maydew (2002), and Francis et al., (2002) for recent applications).”