Analysts' Forecasts and Brokerage-Firm Trading

By Paul J. Irvine. 2003

314 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8c819f25dc53d4bb918a206bdb88714e286d3b3d

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Citations in the corpus

The Financial Analyst Forecasting Literature: A Taxonomy with Suggestions for Further Research (2008, unknown): “20 Research also suggests that analysts generate more trading commissions with buy than sell recommendations (e.g., Irvine, 2004; Hayes, 1998) (described in our Table 5).”
Analyst Recommendations, Mutual Fund Herding, and Overreaction in Stock Prices (2014, unknown): “17 For example, Irvine (2004) shows that sell-side analysts’ earn-”
Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence on Managerial Skills (2007, background): “” In addition, Womack (1996), Kim, Lin, and Slovin (1997), and Jegadeesh et al. (2004) show that changes in sellside analysts’ recommendations carry useful predictive information about asset fundamentals.”
Firms’ innovation strategy under the shadow of analyst coverage (2019, background): “…and utilities firms (SIC codes between 4000 and 4999 and between 6000 and 8Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012), Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003), Irvine (2004), Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2006), and Derrien and Kecskes (2013) also show that, by serving as external monitors, financial analysts…”
The Informational Role of Bond Analysts (2009, unknown): “For example, Irvine (2001, 2004) shows that a broker's trading volume is significantly higher in stocks covered by the equity analysts it employs, and is specifically higher in the weeks following analysts' forecasts and recommendations.”
When Security Analysts Talk, Who Listens? (2007, background): “Second, given that analysts can generate higher trading commissions for their respective brokerages through positive recommendations (Irvine, 2004), investment banks have adopted compensation plans that explicitly reward security analysts more for issuing buys than sells, regardless of the profitabi”
A New Approach to Predicting Analyst Forecast Errors: Do Investors Overweight Analyst Forecasts? (2013, background): “Additional studies find that biases result from analysts’ incentives to generate trading revenue and institutional clientele (e.g., Hayes, 1998; Irvine, 2004), asymmetric responses to negative and positive news (e.g., Easterwood and Nutt, 1999), underreaction to past news (e.g., Lys and Sohn, 1990;…”
Brokerage Commissions and Institutional Trading Patterns (2009, unknown): “…broker, many clients apparently do, perhaps to reward the analyst whose bonus is often tied to the commission revenue generated by their recommendations.21 21 Irvine (2004) reports that brokerage-firm trading volume in the recommended stock rises significantly after Buy recommendations.”
The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions (2006, unknown): “Irvine (2004) uses a dataset from the Toronto Stock Exchange that identifies the broker associated with every trade.”