On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments

By M. Dahlberg, E. Johansson. American Political Science Review, 2002

567 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7139b2843a594bd06f27a5ef0dafeabca459bd5c

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Citations in the corpus

Electoral Goals and Center-State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India (2008, unknown): “γ ′ (gs)− γ ′ (gn) = −(2θ − 1)U (gs)Φ(T s (π L, λs, h)− (2θ − 1)U(gs)) (9)”
Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics (2005, unknown): “2 Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) study the political allocation of an environmental spending program in Sweden, finding support for models suggesting politicians target swing voters.”
Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Local Public Goods (2018, background): “…in Australia, a wealthy democracy with single-member districts (Denemark, 2000); in Sweden, a wealthy democracy with proportional representation (Dahlberg & Johansson, 2002); in India, a developing democracy with single-member districts (Min, 2015); in Benin, a developing democracy with…”
Dynamic Commitment and the Soft Budget Constraint: An Empirical Test (2010, background): “29 For Swedish studies, see Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003).”
Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain (2012, background): “17 This explains why some authors have proposed estimating the vote density function for each of the jurisdictions using survey data and then computing the density at the cut-point (Dalhberg and Johansson, 2002).”
The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy (2007, methodology): “Following Case (2001) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), we use it as a proxy for the number of swing voters.”
Distributive Politics Around the World (2013, methodology): “An example of the data predicament is provided by Dahlberg & Johansson (2002), who use survey data to identify core and swing voters.”
Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana (2011, background): “Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) determine that municipalities with swing voters were favored in the award of temporary grants in Sweden, using estimated distributions of political party preference, as well as the vote margin between the two political blocs in the last election as the relevant…”
Old Problems in the New Solutions? Politically Motivated Allocation of Program Benefits and the “New” Fertilizer Subsidies (2011, background): “Khemani (2007) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) also find evidence of politically aligned agencies targeting benefits to swing voters.”
The regional allocation of infrastructure investment: The role of equity, efficiency and political factors (2005, background): “…and Craig and Heikkila, 1989), or other recent papers that focus on political motivations driving the territorial distribution of intergovernmental grants and other public programs (e.g., Levitt and Snyder, 1995, Cadot et al., 1999, Case, 2001, Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002 and Johansson, 2003).”
Beyond Clientelism (2008, unknown): “Considerable debate exists on whether clientelist parties target swing voters (Dahlberg & Johanson, 2002; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Schady, 2000; Stokes, 2005) or core supporters (Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Cox & McCubbins, 1986; Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, & Magaloni, 2006; Magaloni, 2006).”