Governance with multiple objectives : evidence from top executive turnover in China

By Eric C. Chang, Sonia M. L. Wong. 2009

169 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1c31449d2056c497694c8ef722f9438fa4959b6c

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Lutao Ning
2. Xiaoqiu Song
3. Jing‐Ming Kuo
4. H. Farag
5. C. Mallin
6. Saixing Zeng
7. Meijun Qian
8. Xiaping Cao

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Meijun Qian
2. Xiaping Cao
3. Xiaofei Pan
4. C. Mallin
5. Gary Gang Tian

Citations in the corpus

• Whether Top Executives’ Turnover Influences Environmental Responsibility: From the Perspective of Environmental Information Disclosure (2013, background): “6 Most of the corporate governance literatures divided the stated reasons for turnover into forced and normal groups (Chang and Wong 2009; Firth et al. 2006; Huson et al. 2004); however, it is difficult to classify the reasons of turnover into forced and normal groups because very few press reports ”
• Political capital and CEO entrenchment: Evidence from CEO turnover in Chinese non-SOEs (2017, methodology): “The control variables include firm size, leverage, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO duality, board size, independent director ratio and managerial ownership, following existing studies (Chang and Wong, 2009).”
• The influence of CEO demographic characteristics on corporate risk-taking: evidence from Chinese IPOs (2016, background): “Chang and Wong (2009) claim that either the central or provincial government in China appoints senior directors including the CEO; whilst Li and Tang (2010) claim that the government also appoints the CEOs of non-state-owned companies to ensure their compliance with government policies (Li and Tang…”
• The Real and Accrual-based Earnings Management Behaviors: Evidence from the Split Share Structure Reform in China (2014, background): “Following Chang & Wong, 2009; Chen, Firth, & Xu, 2009; Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006; Huyghebaert & Wang, 2012, the SSSREF can be considered as leading to partial privatization since the state still retains a significant ownership after the firms have been listed.”