The Economics of Two-Sided Markets
By Marc Rysman. 2009
1,239 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Marketing, Media Technology, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1c0c366611a5049d783edb97c8fce22b666c4622
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Marketing
- Justus Haucap
- Ralf Dewenter
- J. Pinkse
- Ans Kolk
- Cristiano Codagnone
- Bertin Martens
- Torben Stühmeier
- Tobias Wenzel
In Media Technology
- Tobias Wenzel
- Torben Stühmeier
- Justus Haucap
- Ralf Dewenter
- Raphael Amit
- Georgios Zervas
- John W. Byers
- Scott Duke Kominers
In Strategy and Management
- J. Pinkse
- Justus Haucap
- Ans Kolk
- Ralf Dewenter
- Cristiano Codagnone
- Torben Stühmeier
- Tobias Wenzel
- Bertin Martens
Citations in the corpus
- Competition and antitrust in internet markets (2016, background): “A market is typically called two-sided or even multi-sided if indirect network effects are of major importance (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Wright, 2004; Armstrong, 2006; Rysman, 2009.”
- The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry (2017, positive): “theory of two-sided markets, for example through structural models that establish theories of price structure and usage (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2009; Weyl, 2010), and models which connect innovations in product design to network effects (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005).”
- Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies (2010, neutral): “Fourth, the bond rating business, like many information industries, involves a “two-sided market,” where payments can come from one or both sides of the market (as discussed in this journal by Rysman, 2009).”
- Unpaid Crowd Complementors: The Platform Network Effect Mirage (2015, neutral): “The prevailing characterization of platforms in the literature is as a multi-sided market in which complementors selling to users can generate cross-platform or ‘indirect’ network effects (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Rysman, 2009).”
- Multi-Sided Platforms (2015, neutral): “Both approaches have limitations (see Rysman, 2009).”
- Explaining Adoption and Use of Payment Instruments by U.S. Consumers (2016, neutral): “Our paper is relevant for the literature on two-sided markets as well (see Rochet and Tirole 2006; Rysman 2009; Hagiu and Wright 2011).”
- Value Creation through Novel Resource Configurations in a Digitally Enabled World (2017, background): “Prototype C illustrates the resource con fi guration in a fi rm-enabled two-sided market, which has been increasingly adopted by fi rms in the digital age (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006; Rysman, 2009).”
- The Impact of Regulation on Innovation (2016, background): “in the area of wireless communication, or on two sided markets (Rysman 2009) on innovation.”
- Semi-collusion in media markets (2011, background): “A negative attitude towards advertising leads to negative indirect net- 4For surveys of this literature see Roson (2005), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Rysman (2009).”
- Regulating TNCs: Should Uber and Lyft set their own rules? (2019, background): “See [23] and [24] for a summary of literature on two-sided platforms, and [25] for a general theory of monopoly pricing in multi-sided platforms.”
- Single-leader multi-follower games for the regulation of two-sided Mobility-as-a-Service markets (2021, background): “Thus we propose a name-your-own-price (NYOP) auction-based mechanism, where the user determines the price by submitting a bid and the auctioneer can either accept or reject the user by comparing with an internal threshold price which is invisible for users (Spann et al. 2004). Terwiesch et al. (2005”
- Why Do People Consume and Provide Sharing Economy Accommodation?—A Sustainability Perspective (2018, background): “In the two-sided market, service users and service providers interact across the platform, and the value of the platform increases with the size of the network [7].”
- Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom? An Early Look at Large Numbers of Software App Developers and Patterns of Innovation (2012, neutral): “…that that we might begin to understand innovation incentives by likening groups of applications producers on a platform to markets of competing innovators, in which case varying intensity of competition and rivalry should shape innovation incentives (Parker and Van Alstyne 2008, Rysman 2009).”
- Platform Ecosystems: How Developers Invert the Firm (2017, neutral): “…literature conceives of platforms as mediating markets with network externalities that cross distinct user groups and shows how subsidies to one group become optimal (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Eisenmann et al. 2006; Parker and Van Alstyne 2000a, 2000b, 2005; Rochet and Tirole 2003; Rysman 2009).”
- Towards a Fair Marketplace: Counterfactual Evaluation of the trade-off between Relevance, Fairness & Satisfaction in Recommendation Systems (2018, background): “…incorporating (business) constraints while optimizing metrics in a ranking setting [24] Marketplaces: Research on platforms, and marketplaces have enjoyed a long history of detailed research [23, 26], with past work exploring competition [3], strategies [7] and economies [16] in such marketplaces.”
- A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms (2010, background): “By E. GLEN WEYL∗ Draft: October 6, 2009 I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks.”